The quantity and quality of terrorism: The DTV dataset

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Abstract

This article presents a comprehensive dataset of fatalities of domestic terrorism in Western European countries for the period 1965-2000. The Domestic Terrorism Victims (DTV) dataset, unlike other datasets such as TWEED or GTD1, is based on local sources in each country and, consequently, it registers a higher number of killings. Measurement of the quantity of terrorism is therefore more accurate. The unit of observation is the fatality, not the attack, although the data can be transformed in terms of attacks. Detailed information about each killing has been collected, making it possible to create new variables about the quality of violence: target selection, selectivity of the killings, and their strategic aim. By way of example, it is shown how the type of ideology generates interesting variation in these three variables. Variation of this kind makes the DTV particularly suitable for hypothesis testing on the quantity and quality of terrorism.

Introduction

In this article we present a dataset that can help the research community to test hypotheses regarding both the quantity and the quality of terrorist attacks. Quantity refers to the number of attacks or fatalities produced by a terrorist organization: Why are some terrorist organizations more lethal than others? Why are some terrorist groups more resilient than others? Quality refers to target selection, the selectivity of violence, and its strategic aim: Why do some terrorist organizations focus on civilians whereas

others target security forces? Why do some terrorist organizations attack the state whereas others attack society or some specific social group?

Our dataset, Domestic Terrorist Victims (DTV), covers all fatalities produced by domestic terrorist organizations in Western Europe during the period 1965-2000. We have relied on local sources in each country, seeking to collect all the available information about every terrorist organization and each of their killings. As a consequence, the DTV far exceeds in accuracy and detail all other existing datasets. As we explain in more detail below, the unit of observation in the DTV is the fatality. We have identified each victim, including first name and surname, and we have collected information about relevant circumstances of the attack and the target, including date and location, authorship, status of the victim, form of killing, lethality of the attack, and other indicators that we explain below. We have been able to track the killing of 4,803 people and the authorship in almost every case.

The main value of the dataset is its accuracy and detail. We contend that the reliability of the DTV is crucial to answer questions both about the quantity and quality of terrorism. On the one hand, we can get much closer to the historical truth about the scope of terrorist violence in Western European societies in the period under study. This makes possible a correct classification of terrorist organizations in terms of both lethality and duration. On the other hand, we have sufficient information about each killing to create variables that measure various dimensions of the quality of violence that, to our knowledge, have not yet been studied in a systematic way.[1] We are thus able

[1] Although there have been some efforts to coding target selection (Clark, 1984; Crettiez, 1999; Della Porta, 1995; McKeown, 1989), most coding schemes were based on local features of the conflict and were not thought appropriate for comparative uses or for hypothesis testing.

to show the variation that exists with regard to both the quantity and quality of terrorism.

In this article we firstly describe the dataset and compare it with other datasets such as TWEED or GTD1. Secondly, we discuss the analytical problems that arose in the construction of variables that measure the quality of violence, and we show some of the variance that can be found in the data. We close with some comments and questions about the research agenda that the DTV opens.

The DTV dataset

Conceptual issues

We use a restrictive definition of terrorist violence, according to which terrorism is political violence carried out by insurgent organizations that are unable to liberate territory from state's control and therefore remain underground (see Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle, 2009). Thus, we stand for an actor-based definition of terrorism rather than for an action-based one. In our view, action-based definitions, by putting the emphasis on the aim of instilling fear in the population, or on the distinction between the direct target of violence and the main target (for a review, see Schmid and Jongman, 1988), are not precise enough for the creation of datasets. They are simply impractical for comparative work, because many other types of violence that have nothing to do with terrorism share these features. Should the killings of defectors and informers in civil wars be included in the dataset? What about the bombing campaign over London in the Second World War?

The actor-sense definition avoids all these ambiguities: terrorism is political violence exerted by underground political organizations. At least in the case of Western Europe, this definition fits nicely with the 1,000 fatality-threshold operational rule that is used to codify civil wars (see Sambanis, 2004), since European terrorist groups very rarely reach the 1,000 fatality threshold, with the only exception of the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland, which killed 1,646 people in the period of study. We do not consider that the Troubles in Northern Ireland were a civil war even though the total number of fatalities was clearly over the threshold. The reason is that the armed organizations had to act underground. The conflict evolved as a series of terrorist campaigns that did not resemble the kind of violent dynamics that is observed in most civil wars.

Precisely because terrorist groups are underground, the asymmetry of power between the state and the violent challenger is maximum; greater indeed than in the case of guerrilla insurgencies, which have *de facto* control over part of the area of the state's territory and have some military power to fight against the state. This explains why the lethality of terrorist conflicts is in general much lower than that of civil wars. According to Lacina (2006), the median number of fatalities in civil wars is 10,500, the mean being much higher. According to the DTV, in Western European countries the median number of fatalities produced by terrorist organizations is only 3 and the mean value is 40.6. This difference is quite telling about the asymmetry of power in terrorist conflicts.

The DTV only covers domestic terrorism. Following Engene (2007: 111-2), this is defined in terms of the nationality of the terrorists. If they have the nationality of the country in which they attack, then this is considered domestic terrorism, regardless of the nationality of the victims. We also cover the few cases in which some of these

European organizations attack beyond their national borders (e.g. the German Red Army Fraction killed in Sweden and the Netherlands).

Type of violence

Based on our familiarity with the phenomenon of terrorism in Western Europe, we distinguish three types of violence. First of all, there is the category of full terrorism. This corresponds to killings carried out by underground organizations. An organization implies resources, internal structure, coordination, and some planning of activities. The vast majority of killings fall into this category: 4,538 out of 4,803, that is, 94.5% of the total.

Then there are some killings, also politically motivated, that are carried out by people who are only loosely associated, where planning is almost non-existent, and violence is spontaneous to a certain extent. This is what we call "diffuse terrorism", as exemplified for instance by neo-Nazi, xenophobic violence that erupted in many European countries in the 1990s. It also applies to some attacks by Leftist anarchists (the *autonomia* movement) in Italy in the late 1970s. We have identified 229 killings (4.8%) that fall under this category of diffuse terrorism.

Finally, there is also urban violence that can barely be considered terrorism. This is fully spontaneous, perpetrators may be friends or members of a gang, and usually no firearms are employed (the victim is stabbed, burnt, or beaten to death.) As long as there is some political motivation in the killing, we include it in the dataset, under the category of urban political violence. Only 36 cases have been registered under this heading, a mere 0.7%.

Throughout the rest of this article, we only refer to full terrorism, which constitutes the main focus of the DTV.

Unit of observation

As was said above, the unit of observation in the DTV is the victim, not the attack.[2] We have chosen this level of analysis because we wanted to have as much detail as possible. We have tracked each fatality by name, looking for his or her relevant characteristics, such as gender, age, and status.

Information is also available about the lethal attack, so that the entire dataset can be reconstructed with lethal attacks as the unit of observation. In fact, there is very little difference between lethal attacks and fatalities, since terrorism is much more selective than usually thought. Thus, there are 4,538 fatalities and 3,325 lethal attacks: that means only 1.36 fatalities per lethal attack. This is rather different to the type of indiscriminate, Al Qaeda-style attack that is associated with the quintessence of terrorist activity.

Why do we only consider fatalities and not other terrorist actions, such as kidnapping, hostage-taking, extortion, and more generally non-lethal attacks? Firstly, because there is more information available about lethal attacks than non-lethal ones. Secondly, fatalities are a homogenous category, which makes the comparison across countries and time easier, whereas attacks in general cover very disparate events, from attacks against property to killings. Fatalities, moreover, is the unit of observation that is used to measure the intensity of civil wars. Thirdly, killings are the actions which have the greatest impact. Non-lethal terrorist organizations receive very little attention and cannot aspire to pose a serious challenge to the state or to the system.

With the evidence at hand, we can be confident that the focus on fatalities does not create a particular bias, at least in the case of large terrorist organizations. For ETA,

[2] As the DTV is about victims of terrorism, we do not include among fatalities those terrorists that died in the attack or who died manipulating a bomb.

the correlation between the yearly number of total actions (as counted by the Spanish Ministry of Interior) and the yearly number of fatalities (from the DTV) is 0.79 (De la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca 2004: 60). As for the IRA, Morrisey and Smith (2002: 190) report a .93 correlation between yearly figures of deaths and injuries associated with political violence in Northern Ireland. Although these are only partial results, they show that fatalities are not a bad proxy of terrorist activity in general.

Scope

The DTV covers 18 Western European countries for the period 1965-2000.[3] In six of these countries (Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, and Switzerland) we did not find any victim of domestic political violence. The only reasons to restrict the sample to Western European countries were availability of information and practicality. In the near future we plan to enlarge the sample to other developed countries (Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand and United States.)

Regarding the time period, 1965-2000, it covers the whole cycle of domestic terrorism in Western Europe. As can be seen in Figure 1, there was an explosion of political violence around 1970. We start some years before, in 1965, so that the dramatic increase of fatalities in 1969-71 is more clearly pronounced. After 1980, a slow declining trend is observed. By 2000, the cycle was almost over. Insofar as the whole cycle is captured in the dataset, there should not be much concern about the time truncation of the sample. If the dataset ends in 2000 and does not extend to the present, it is due to the kind of information we have used to track the killings. There is a time

[3] Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In the dataset, Northern Ireland has been considered as a country (this is therefore country 19).

lapse between the occurrence of the killing and its incorporation into the local secondary sources we use to gather information.

FIGURE 1

Sources

The DTV has been based on an enormous list of sources in six different languages, including monographs on particular terrorist organizations, national newspapers, documents written by terrorist organizations themselves, data collected by the state, and web pages that contain information about victims of terrorism. In almost every case, we have been able to crosscheck information about victims. When the sources were in conflict, we have made further inquiries until we were able to come to a decision. A full list of sources is included in the codebook that accompanies the dataset.

Comparing the DTV with other datasets

There are very few cross-national datasets of domestic terrorism. The most significant ones are *Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data* (TWEED), compiled by Jan-Oskar Engene (2004, 2007), and the *Global Terrorism Database, 1970-1997* (GTD1), compiled by Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan. TWEED covers 18 Western European countries for the period 1950-2004. The unit of analysis is the terrorist event. There are 11,245 records in the dataset. The source is the *Keesing's Record of World Events*. This

publication predominantly collects information from newspapers, news services, and government sources. It is particularly detailed with regard to European countries.

GTD1 is a much broader dataset. Again, the unit of observation is the terrorist event. It covers the entire world, and includes 61,637 incidents. The original information, based on newspapers, was collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service. The information is indeed vast, but it is also chaotic. It includes all kinds of violent activity, from acts of piracy to the Rwanda civil war, and incidents carried out by a single terrorist group may appear under three or four different names.

Due to the sources drawn upon by TWEED and GTD1, they contain, not surprisingly, many mistakes, both absences and false positives. Additionally, a large number of incidents cannot be associated with a particular organization. Likewise, these datasets fail to make the proper distinctions between different branches of a movement: no clear distinctions are made between the Official and the Provisional IRA, between military ETA and political-military ETA, or between the Red Brigades and its various splinters. These are the costs that have to be paid for the greater scope in temporal and geographical terms of these datasets. In the trade-off between accuracy and scope, the DTV is indeed more limited than TWEED or GTD1, but more accurate nonetheless.

Table I compares the results of DTV, TWEED, and GTD1 regarding the lethality of organizations that, according to the DTV, killed at least five people. In order to make the comparison possible, we have used the period that was common to the three datasets, 1970-1997 and, in the case of the DTV, we have merged different organizations into a single one (such as the different branches of ETA or the IRA), adapting in this way the DTV to the other datasets.

TABLE I

As can be seen in Table I, the DTV registers more than twice the number of killings of the other datasets. This is due in part to the fact that many killings are not assigned to any organization in TWEED and GTD1, but also because these two datasets simply fail to register many killings. Thus, we see in Table I that 1,685 people were killed by the Official and Provisional IRA according to the DTV, while the figures are much lower according to TWEED or GTD1 (603 and 769 respectively).

Although the differences in quantity between the datasets are perhaps not so important for cross-national comparison, they are crucial for establishing the truth about the intensity of terrorism in each country and for comparison at the level of the terrorist organization. One of the main advantages of tracking each killing is that it allows a much more precise description of the lethality, targeting, and development of terrorist organizations. We can therefore generate reliable indicators about terrorist organizations and look for the explanatory variables that may account for the existing variance.

Variables

Perhaps the greatest added value of the DTV dataset consists in the new variables that it provides about the quality of terrorism. In this section we briefly review the variables

that require some clarification, devoting more space to our original schemes of codification for quality of terrorism.[4]

Ideology

We classify terrorist organizations (and all the killings caused by them) into four ideological families. Firstly, extreme-left terrorism, which seeks regime-change through a mass uprising. A paradigmatic example are the Red Brigades in Italy. Secondly, extreme-right terrorism, which also seeks regime-change, but in a very different way. Terror is intended to create social chaos, so that the population approves an authoritarian solution. Good illustrations are the Nar in Italy or the Triple A in Spain. Thirdly, nationalist terrorism seeks territorial- rather than regime-change. Violence is a direct challenge to the state. The terrorists aspire to bargain with the state about control of a territory. The Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland or military ETA in Spain are good examples in this category. Finally, there is also vigilante terrorism. It tries to prevent a change of the status quo and is mainly sectarian in nature, insofar as it attacks those social groups that act against the status quo. The UVF fits this pattern well.

Nationalist is by far the most frequent type of terrorism in Western Europe, with 63.2% of all killings, followed by vigilante (which is typically a reaction to nationalist groups) with 21.9%; extreme left and extreme right terrorism have approximately the same weight, representing 7.6 and 7.3% of all killings.

Method

This refers to the instrument used for the killing. We have defined some broad categories. First, firearms. Second, all kind of bombs, except car bombs. We have

[4] For a full list of variables, see the DTV Codebook.

reserved a special category for car bombs, due to their destructive capacity and their non-selective, indiscriminate nature. Finally, there is a fourth category for other killings that do not involve either firearms or bombs. The most frequent method is shooting (65.3% of all killings), followed by bombs (25.4%), car bombs (6.7%), and a residual category for other means (2.5%).

Claim

We have sought information on whether attacks were claimed or not. This is relevant for the analysis of the terrorist organization's behaviour. In theory, there is an element of propaganda in every act of terrorism and therefore one would expect that all attacks would be claimed by their authors. Yet, a certain number of attacks are never claimed, are falsely claimed, or are claimed by more than one organization. This may be related to the image or reputation that the organization may wish to maintain for its supporters. If an organization's supporters disapprove of certain kinds of attacks, the terrorists could seek to disguise their authorship by not claiming attacks that they actually carried out.

This is, however, a problematical variable. Some attacks may be not claimed simply because the authorship is obvious. This happens when there is only one terrorist group acting in a country, or when the style of the attack leaves no room for doubt about authorship. In all these cases, we have added these attacks to those that were claimed. Despite the already generous conditions for the claim category of the variable, the percentage of claimed killings is not so high, 66.0%; 32.4% are not claimed, 1.5% are false claims, and only 0.2% corresponds to multiple claims.

Status

The status variable is crucial to understand patterns of target selection. Six categories have been defined. First, military. Second, police forces (including private police agents). Third, paramilitaries. Fourth, politicians and public officials (judges, high-ranking civil servants, prison officers, etcetera). Fifth, entrepreneurs. And, finally, other civilians. In the case of civilians who had retired from the army or the police, and were killed because of their former involvement in the security forces, we classify them under military or police.

Of course, in some terrorist conflicts other categories may be relevant. For instance, both the IRA and ETA targeted drug-dealers. But given that the DTV deals with all European terrorism, we have limited the variable to the more general categories.

One interesting lesson that can be drawn from this variable is that those definitions that characterize terrorism in terms of killing civilians are simply not applicable to Western European terrorist groups. If we collapse the categories of the variable into two categories, combatants (military, police, and paramilitaries) and non-combatants, it turns out that combatants represent 45.9% of all killings. This cannot be regarded as a residual category.

TABLE II

Table II shows that there is important variation depending on the ideology of the terrorist organization. Two clearly distinct groups emerge. On the one hand, there is nationalist and extreme left-wing terrorism, with more than 55% of combatant victims. On the other, vigilante and extreme right-wing terrorism, with below 20% of

combatants killed. It is this second group that best fits the traditional definition of terrorism as violence against civilians.

Selectivity

The status variable captures an objective trait of the victim. This is an important piece of information to understand target selection. But it is not an adequate measurement of the selectivity of violence, because two people with the same status might be killed for very different motives. For instance, some terrorist organizations kill entrepreneurs because they coerce them to pay, while some others kill them for ideological (anti-capitalist) reasons.

In order to codify the information about the selection of victims, we start with the two limiting cases, maximum and minimum selectivity. Maximum selectivity corresponds to the case in which the terrorist organization kills someone because of her behaviour. This definition assumes that any other person with the same traits as the victim, but without having carried out the action of the victim, is not a target. A paradigmatic example is that of a civilian killed because he or she shared information with security forces about the terrorists. The social role of the victim, or her political or religious ideas, does not matter here. The same holds true for an entrepreneur who does not pay extortion money to the terrorists. That entrepreneur is killed not because of her profession, but because of certain behaviour. Thus, those entrepreneurs who pay do not become targets. We call these victims "behaviour-based" victims. They are selected and killed on an individual basis. This type of killing requires detailed information about the target by the terrorists.

On the opposite side, we have minimum selectivity when the attack is aimed at any member whatsoever of the society. The Al Qaeda attacks in New York, Madrid,

London or India come immediately to mind, but it is possible to mention others, such as the bombing of the train station in Bologna (Italy) on 2 August 1980, which killed 85 people and injured more than 200. This attack was planned by the fascist terrorist organization Nar. Any Italian who happened to be in that train station could have been a target. These victims are "society-based". This type of killing is very cheap in terms of the information that terrorists need to find the target.

In-between, we distinguish two other possibilities that have in common the fact that the victim belongs to a group, all of whose members are targeted regardless of their specific behaviour. On the one hand, we have the group made up of those who work for the state: police forces, military, judges, prison officers and government officials, that is, decision-makers, civil-servants and members of the security forces. On the other hand, we have those who belong to social groups characterized by ideological or religious features. When the PIRA kills a Protestant, it is neither killing a person because of her behaviour, nor killing just any person living in Northern Ireland; rather, it is killing someone because she belongs to a group that has been targeted by the TO. When Italian fascist terrorist organizations kill left-wing revolutionary activists, they are attacking a more or less definite social group (those who have revolutionary beliefs). All these attacks against social groups are sectarian in nature.

So far, we have assumed that all killings are the outcome of an intended plan. However, it often occurs that terrorist groups produce collateral killings, or make mistakes about the identity of the target. Typically, a collateral death occurs when a passer-by is killed by the explosion of a car bomb aimed at a vehicle of the security forces. A mistake occurs when, due to some intelligence failure, the terrorists kill the wrong person. In both cases, it is possible to say that the killing of these people was not intended (nonetheless, even if the killing was not intended, the terrorists are fully

responsible for the killing: it is obvious that without exploding a car bomb, there would be no collateral killings). In Figure 2 we have summarized the procedure followed to codify the selectivity variable.

FIGURE 2

Table III provides information about the ideological inclination of terrorist organizations and their selectivity. The aim here is to check whether ideological differences produce differences in behaviour. In Table II we saw that vigilante and extreme right-wing terrorist groups were similar regarding targets: both tended to choose civilians. However, they are rather different in terms of selectivity. Whereas vigilante terrorism is mainly sectarian in its attacks (71% of all its killings), extreme right-wing terrorism opts for attacks on society (53% of all its killings.) It is worth noting that, in general, society killings (the most indiscriminate ones) represent only 9% of all killings in Western Europe.

Table III also reveals that nationalist and extreme-left terrorism are very similar regarding selectivity, just as they were similar regarding target selection (see Table II). Yet, there is an important difference when it comes to individual or behaviour-based killings: the percentage is noticeably higher for nationalist than for left-wing groups (14.5 and 9.0% respectively). In this respect, nationalist terrorism seems closer to the vigilante category (13.8% of individual killings.) This is entirely logical, since vigilante and nationalist terrorism are those more concerned with territory (as opposed to regime). The conflict between nationalist and vigilante terrorists makes the control of territory crucial. Solving problems of defection is key to achieve this control.

TABLE 3

Strategy

The information collected to code selectivity may be used in a different way for the creation of a variable about the strategic aim of the killing. Following McCormick's (2003) distinction between influence and security, we try to classify each victim in either category. Influence refers to the ultimate goals that the terrorists pursue through violence; security, in turn, refers to the survival and reproduction of the organization.

Depending on the goals of the terrorists and the role that violence is supposed to have in the consecution of these goals, influence may take different aspects. For revolutionary terrorism, violence is intended to trigger mass mobilization. For nationalist terrorism, violence is a form of attrition against the state. When a killing, therefore, is related to the goals of the organization, we classify it under the influence category.

Regarding security, we include under this heading all killings that were related to any of the following five problems that a terrorsit organization must face to survive: (i) internal discipline, (ii) denunciation, (iii) finance, (iv) attacks by rival armed organizations, and (v) recruitment and popular support.

The connection between selectivity and strategy is the following. Individual or behaviour-based killings are related to security problems (they aim at generating compliance at different levels: within the organization, within supporters, within

enemies). Likewise, attacks against the State or against society at large are influence-oriented.

It is harder to say, nonetheless, whether sectarian killings correspond to security or to influence. Sectarian killings have an element of influence: they show that the State does not have the monopoly of organized violence, disrupting social life in a dramatic way. But there is also an element of security, for these killings are intended to deter and weaken inimical groups. Moreover, there may be a demand from below (from the community of support) for sectarianism. Revenge is a powerful motivation in conflicts with multilateral violence (Petersen, 2001; Kalyvas, 2006). Insofar as terrorists may try to meet this demand, the aim of the attack has more to do with security than with influence. Due to this ambiguity, we have established a three-fold categorization, with sectarian killings between security and influence. Here collateral and mistake killings are excluded, as they do not respond to strategic considerations.

TABLE IV

According to this scheme of codification, 53.9% of all intended killings are influence-oriented, 15.0% are security-oriented, and 31.1% are sectarian in nature (see Table IV). Differences in strategy among ideological types are not as pronounced as with selectivity. Now the main variation is between vigilante terrorism and the rest. In strategic terms, vigilantism seems to be but another name for sectarian violence: 78% of its intended killings are sectarian. The percentage is below 25% for the other three types (nationalist, extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing.) This is consistent with the reactive condition of vigilante terrorism. By contrast, more pro-active types of terrorism

intending to change the status quo in one way or another spend most of its resources on influence-killings.

Readers who may have doubts about the exact meaning of both the selectivity and the strategy variables are referred to the DTV's codebook, which includes more detailed explanations and provides examples about how difficult cases were codified.

Research agenda

So far, most comparative work in the field of terrorism has been based on international terrorism datasets. We know, however, that international attacks are a small fraction of total terrorist violence (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008: 447). Most of it is domestic. Moreover, it is doubtful that international attacks are a representative sample of the universe of terrorism. The situation has improved in recent years with the creation of the first datasets on domestic terrorism such as TWEED or GTD1. DTV is another attempt to enrich our knowledge about domestic terrorism.

The main value of the DTV is its accuracy. As we have shown, it registers many more fatalities than other existing datasets. Thanks to the information we have collected about each victim, it becomes possible to reconstruct the historical truth about the intensity of terrorism in Western European countries. Also, this information makes the creation of new variables about the quality of terrorist violence possible. We have tried to impose some analytical structure in the codification of these variables, so that they can be employed to test hypotheses about the behaviour of terrorist organizations. Most of the datasets on terrorism lack any theoretical consideration about the codification of information. One of the aims of the DTV is to remedy this state of affairs, providing variables that are useful for hypotheses testing.

From a macro-level perspective, the DTV allows the researcher to investigate why some countries suffer more terrorism than others and whether all ideological kinds of terrorism (nationalist, vigilante, extreme left, and extreme right) respond to the same causal determinants. From a micro-level perspective, the DTV is particularly suitable for the analysis of terrorist organizations' behaviour, what we have called the quality of violence. Hypotheses about target selection, the degree of selectivity, or the strategic aims of the terrorists, can be tested thanks to the variables that are included in the DTV. Lastly, questions about the timing of terrorist attacks and their spatial distribution might also receive empirical treatment with this dataset.

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Figure 1: Number of Terrorist Killings in Western Europe by Year, 1965-2000



Figure 2. Codification of selectivity



Table I. Comparison of the DTV with two other datasets on domestic terrorism

Organization	Country	Fatalities		
		DTV	TWEED	GTD1
Brabant killers	Belgium	28	17	7
FNLC (all branches)	France	43	9	11
Action Directe	France	12	5	9
RAF	Germany	34	31	21
17th November Revolutionary Organization	Greece	21	18	25
Brigate Rosse (all branches)	Italy	77	48	69
Prima Linea	Italy	17	9	17
PAC	Italy	5	0	0
Ordine nuovo	Italy	12	0	15
Ordine nero	Italy	26	23	24
Nar	Italy	117	90	10
IRA (all branches)	Northern Ireland (NI)	1685	603	769
INLA	NI	124	40	40
IPLO	NI	23	2	7
LVF	NI	7	2	2
UVF	NI	507	29	28
UFF	NI	150	35	51
UDA	NI	225	1	0
RepAF	NI	24	0	10
FP 25 Abril	Portugal	20	7	10
ETA (all branches)	Spain	742	466	745
CAA	Spain	32	2	1
GRAPO	Spain	81	50	83
BE	Spain	26	6	15
Triple A	Spain	11	8	13
GAE	Spain	5	4	1
GAL	Spain	27	27	19

Total		4081	1532	2002

Notes: The period covered, 1970-97, corresponds to the years that are common to the three datasets. Only organizations that killed at least five people according to the DTV are included.

Legends: FNLC (National Liberation Front of Corsica), RAF (Red Army Fraction), PAC (Armed Proletarian for Communism), Nar (Revolutionary Armed Nuclei), IRA (Irish Republican Army), INLA (Irish National Liberation Army), IPLO (Irish People's Liberation Organisation), LVF (Loyalist Volunteer Force), UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force), UFF (Ulster Freedom Fighters), UDA (Ulster Defence Association), RepAF (Republican Action Force), FP 25 Abril (25 April Popular Forces), ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom), CAA (Anti-capitalist Autonomous Commandos), GRAPO (First October Anti-fascist Groups), BVE (Spanish-Basque Battalion), GAE (Spanish Armed Groups), GAL (Liberation Anti-terrorist Groups).

Table II. Victim status by type of terrorism in Western European countries. Vertical percentages

	Nationalist terrorism	Vigilante terrorism	Extreme-left terrorism	Extreme-right terrorism	Total
Combatants	59.7	11.8	57.0	18.0	45.9
Non-combatants	40.3	88.2	43.0	82.0	54.1
N	2,862	993	344	333	4,532

Table III. Selectivity by Type of Terrorist Organizations. Vertical percentages

	Nationalist terrorism	Vigilante terrorism	Extreme-left terrorism	Extreme-right terrorism	Total
Individual killing	13.8	14.5	9.0	7.8	13.4
State killing	0.8	52.9	65.7	9.0	39.4
Social group killing	71.0	15.1	14.2	23.2	27.7
Society killing	5.4	5.5	3.2	53.0	8.9
Collateral	3.1	9.3	6.4	3.9	7.3
Mistake	5.8	2.7	1.5	3.0	3.3
N	977	2,857	344	332	4,510

Table IV. Strategy by Type of Terrorism. Vertical Percentages

	Vigilante	Nationalist	Extreme left	Extreme right	Total
Influence killings	6.9	66.4	74.5	66.7	53.9
Sectarian killings	78.0	17.2	15.6	24.9	31.1
Security killings	15.2	16.5	9.9	8.4	15.0
N	890	2,516	314	309	4,029