

ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR “REBELS WITHOUT A TERRITORY. AN ANALYSIS OF NON-TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS IN THE WORLD, 1970-1997”.

January 20, 2012

1. Introduction

“Rebels Without a Territory. An Analysis of Non-territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970-1997” mentions a number of additional results that were not included in the paper due to space limitations. Appendix A includes the list of non-territorial conflicts included in the statistical analysis (Table A1). Besides, Table A2 shows the predicted value of territorial and non-territorial conflicts for different levels of state capacity (GDP per capita). Finally, Figure A1 reproduces the inverted U-shaped relationship between state capacity and the onset of non-territorial conflicts. In Appendix B we replicate the most important findings of the paper. Firstly, we check whether the results hold if the dependent variable for the multinomial analysis uses the list of civil wars compiled by Sambanis (2004) instead of the one by Fearon and Laitin (2003). Secondly, we check whether the results are robust to the use of different measures of GDP per capita and regime type. Thirdly, we explore whether different ways to model time dependence alter the results. Fourthly, we test whether there is some influential case within the list of countries with non-territorial conflicts. Finally, we try alternative estimation techniques. Table B1 describes the set of replication models. In general, the inverted U-shape relationship between GDP per capita and the onset of a non-territorial conflict is very robust to alternative measures of civil war, GDP and model specifications. To the contrary, the positive effect of democracy on the prospect of non-territorial violence onset varies with the use of different measures of regime type, as well as on the inclusion of particular cases.

2. Replication Results

We have run two main replication tests of the results reported in the paper. On the one hand, we have constructed an alternative measure of “warfare” with three values (0, absence of conflict; 1, civil war conflict; 2, non-territorial conflict) in which the list of civil wars is drawn from Sambanis, instead of from Fearon and Laitin. On the other hand, we have used alternative measures for the key independent variables –namely, GDP per capita and regime type. Regarding GDP per capita, we used the Penn World Tables as adjusted for purchasing power parities (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002). Following the convention in the literature, the Penn measure of GDP per capita is included in all models in log. Regarding regime type, in addition to the ACLP measure (Przeworski et al. 2000), we use the yearly country scores of the Scalar Index of Politics (SIP2), compiled by Gates et al. (2006). SIP2 offers a more nuanced assessment of the democratic/dictatorial nature of each political regime by measuring the country in a continuous range between 0 and 1. We did not include POLITY IV because of the problems that POLITY has in the codification of mixed regimes (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010; see also Vreeland 2008).

Table B2 replicates the results reported in Table 2 in the paper, with the Penn measure of GDP per capita replacing the Fearon and Laitin data. The results do not vary much. Leaving aside Sambanis’, the coefficient of GDP per capita goes down when more civil wars are included, and becomes non-significant if the list of conflicts is taken from the GTD dataset. Remarkably, the GDP coefficient in model 6 becomes positive, anticipating the quadratic effect found in the paper.

Tables B3 and B4 include all the combinations of the two measures of GDP per capita (Penn and Fearon & Laitin) and regime type (ACLP and SIP2).¹ Table B3 uses the list of civil wars by Fearon and Laitin to construct the three-value (peace/territorial conflict/non-territorial conflict) dependent variable, whereas Table B4 uses the list by Sambanis.² They replicate the findings of Table 3 in the paper. As we are interested in checking if the positive effects of GDP per capita and democracy on the onset of a non-territorial conflict are robust, we henceforth only report the results of the key comparisons from the multinomial models. This means that we include only the coefficients corresponding to the

¹ The correlation between the two measures of GDP per capita is 0.83; the correlation between the two measures of regime type is -0.86.

² In order to avoid double-counting, we have excluded Iraq 1991 from the Sambanis’ list, since he recognizes there is not enough evidence to identify the fight between the Shia and the Iraqi regime in the aftermath of the first Gulf war as a proper civil war. Therefore, this conflict is only counted as a non-territorial one.

comparison between territorial and non-territorial conflicts (Tables B3, B4, B7 and B9) and the comparison between peace and non-territorial conflict (Tables B5, B6, B8 and B10).

Tables B3 and B4 show that there is always a positive and statistically significant effect of income on the probability of having a non-territorial violence conflict vs. a territorial one –as defined either by Fearon and Laitin or Sambanis. However, the effect of democracy is never significant. As for the other predictors, size, terrain and inequality are not useful determinants of type of conflict, whereas state age indicates that older states have higher odds of experiencing non-territorial conflicts than territorial ones.

In brief, Tables B3 and B4 prove that, within the set of countries experiencing insurgencies, the richer the country, the larger the chance of suffering an insurgency with no territorial control compared to a civil war. To the contrary, democratic regimes do not seem to experience more non-territorial conflicts than territorial ones.

Tables B5 and B6 include again the combinations of the two measures of our key independent variables, but this time to analyze the onset of non-territorial violence in comparison to the absence of conflict. As in the previous set of tables, Table B5 refers to the list of civil wars by Fearon and Laitin, whereas Table B6 contains Sambanis' list. These two tables replicate the findings of Table 4 in the paper.

As we expect to find an inverted U-shape relationship between GDP per capita and the onset of non-territorial insurgencies, we included squared terms for the measure of GDP. Tables B5 and B6 are strong evidence of this link, since the effect comes out in all the models –regardless of the list of civil wars and the measure of GDP per capita we incorporated into the models. Besides, democracy has a positive and significant effect on non-territorial violence onset when SIP is used, but the effect is weakened with ACLP. Population, inequality and state age report always positive and significant coefficients. Finally, the existence of rough terrain falls short of significance levels. In conclusion, Tables B5 and B6 demonstrate that non-territorial violence affects more democracies with a larger-than-average GDP per capita.

Tables B7 and B8 try an alternative specification of time. In addition to using polynomials to deal with the time dependency between units, we employ here the method that Henrik Urdal proposed in his 2006 ISQ piece: *brevity of peace*. Basically, this variable assumes that the effect of a previous conflict is decaying exponentially over time, instead of decaying linearly.

Table B7 replicates the comparison between types of insurgency, this time only for the dependent variable based on Fearon and Laitin, but with the two measures of GDP per capita and regime type. Again, older, wealthier states have more chances of experiencing non-territorial conflicts. Besides, regime type does not distinguish between types. Table B8 shows that the inverted U-shape relationship between state capacity and non-territorial conflicts is resistant to different specifications of time. As for regime type, SIP shows a better fit between democracies and non-territorial violence than the ACLP measure. The other predictors work as expected.

Tables B9 and B10 offer a different type of replication analysis. The goal is to show the reader that the main findings of the paper are not driven by influential cases. Thus, we drop a positive case of non-territorial violence in each regression and check if the results still hold. Table B9 analyzes if some particular episode of non-territorial violence is driving the results reported in Table 3 in the paper (territorial vs. non-territorial conflicts). Although the models were run using the whole set of independent variables included in Model 1 of Table 3, we only report here the coefficients for GDP per capita and regime type (ACLP measure). In order to increase the confidence of the results, we checked the effect of the sequential drop on the two lists of civil wars.

Table B9 shows that the positive effect of GDP per capita on the probability of observing non-territorial violence compared to civil war is very robust and not driven by any particular country. At the same time, the finding that regime type is unrelated to type of conflict is driven by the inclusion of Spain in the sample: if this country is dropped, and two observations of non-territorial conflict are therefore missed, then democracies seem to give more opportunities to non-territorial rebels than to territorial insurgencies. Two mechanisms may account for this finding. On the one hand, dictatorships might be dominant in countries in which the level of social conflict (economic, ethnic, or both) is somehow more severe: the opposition is radicalized and the fight for power ends in a bloody confrontation in which the insurgents have sufficient popular backing so as to control territory. On the other hand, democracies offer more possibilities to weaker insurgent groups because of their legal self-restraint in the face of domestic challenges. Thus, groups with no chance of surviving against a dictatorship could still remain alive if facing a democratic regime.

Back to the results, Table B10 analyzes whether the inverted U-shape relationship between non-territorial violence onset and absence of conflict works even if some positive cases are not included. The effect is very robust and holds regardless of the cases dropped. The magnitude of the effect goes from a bottom value of 0.29 (without Spain) to a high value of 0.45 (without the USA), but this has a very small impact on the cut-point in the curve. Regarding the effect of democracy on non-territorial violence onset, the finding does pretty much depend on the exclusion of particular countries, such as Honduras, Thailand, South Africa, Chile, Argentina, Spain and Iraq, all dictatorships when violence broke out. Thus, democracies seem to give more opportunities to non-territorial insurgents than dictatorships, but this result is more sample-dependent than the inverted U-shape finding.

The last test consists of using alternative estimation methods. Given the fact that our dependent variable captures what the literature calls a “rare event”, we have replicated our main result (Model 1 of Table 4 in the paper) by using rare events logit (relogit) (King and Zeng 2001). This time, we included alternative measures of regime type. We also checked if the inverted U-shape result worked well with a random-effects probit model.

Table B11 displays the results. Although the relogit model increases the magnitude of the positive coefficient for GDP, it does not alter substantively the findings. Neither does the probit model. It is still worth singling out that none of the regime type measures came up with a significant coefficient. This is additional proof that this result is the weaker one in our results.

To sum up, the effects of GDP per capita (linear positive when comparing non-territorial violence to civil war; concave when comparing non-territorial violence to absence of conflict) are very robust, and insensitive to different measurements of the dependent and independent variables, as well as to alternative estimation techniques. On the other side, democracies seem to have more non-territorial conflicts than dictatorships, but being a democracy does not guarantee that insurgents will be unable to liberate territory.

References

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APPENDIX A

Table A1. List of non-territorial conflicts (GTD1, 1970-1997)


Country	Ideology	deaths	first year	last year
Argentina	Left-wing	284	1970	1980
Chile	Left-wing	157	1979	1996
Colombia	Right-wing	181	1989	1990
Ecuador	Left-wing	18	1985	1986
Egypt	Islamist	323	1991	1997
France	Separatist	11	1981	1990
Germany	Left-wing	20	1972	1991
Greece	Left-wing	25	1976	1997
Honduras	Left-wing	66	1982	1994
India	Separatist	24	1979	1982
India	Separatist	130	1984	1997
Iran	Islamist	530	1972	1994
Iraq	Islamist	31	1991	1995
Israel	Separatist	1,361	1970	1996
Italy	Left-wing	130	1974	1988
Lesotho	Left-wing	19	1981	1988
Mexico	Left-wing	72	1975	1980
Pakistan	Islamist	211	1990	1997
Pakistan	Islamist	17	1981	1992
Portugal	Left-wing	10	1980	1986
South Africa	Left-wing	389	1979	1996
South Africa	Separatist	331	1987	1996
Spain	Separatist	777	1972	1997
Spain	Left-wing	83	1975	1992
Thailand	Separatist	22	1988	1997
Turkey	Left-wing	182	1971	1997
UK	Separatist	2,635	1970	1997
USA	Left-wing	17	1971	1973

Table A2. Predicted probabilities for values of economic development and regime (%)

economic development	non-territorial		territorial
	<i>Dictatorships</i>	<i>Democracies</i>	
5th centile	0.14	0.30	1.98
10th	0.15	0.32	1.91
20th	0.16	0.35	1.79
30th	0.18	0.38	1.65
40th	0.21	0.45	1.42
50th	0.25	0.54	1.19
60th	0.31	0.66	0.94
70th	0.36	0.77	0.70
75th	0.39	0.84	0.51
80th	0.38	0.81	0.33
90th	0.16	0.35	0.11
95th	0.06	0.13	0.06
Total	0.09	0.33	0.46

Note: The predicted values for territorial and non-territorial conflicts are calculated using Models 2 in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. All variables except GDP per capita and regime type were set on their means.

Figure A1. Predicted probability of non-territorial conflict onset for different levels of per capita GDP



Note: Figure 1 represents the inverted U-shaped relationship, calculated using the rest of the variables on their means. We used the 5%-95% interval of the distribution of GDP to run the post-estimation. The figure superimposes the onset of non-territorial conflict for some of the 28 positive cases we have in our sample (in the few cases where non-territorial conflicts broke out within the same country, we represent the one with the lowest GDP).

APPENDIX B

Table B2: Replication of Table 2 in the paper, with Penn values for GDP per capita instead of the Fearon and Laitin's measure.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Fearon & Laitin	Sambanis	PRIO Armed Conflict	GTD1	GTD1 (terror only)
GDP per capita ppp (Penn tables)	-0.77***	-0.81***	-0.54***	-0.12	0.41**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.15)
constant	2.11*	2.56**	0.63	-3.09**	-8.35***
	(1.01)	(0.96)	(0.82)	(0.94)	(1.26)
N	3254	3245	3272	3212	3579
Prob>Chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.01
pseudo R-square	0.056	0.060	0.030	0.006	0.013
Number of conflicts	68	91	104	79	29

Standard errors in parentheses; † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table B3. Replication of Table 3 in the paper, with two measures of GDP, regime type and the DV based on FL. Territorial vs. Non-territorial Conflicts (0=Territorial Conflicts).

F&L	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8
GDP FL	0.25*	0.21*	0.20*	0.19†				
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)				
GDP PPP					0.60†	0.54†	0.66*	0.57*
					(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.28)
Reg (ACLP)	-0.55	-0.52					-0.17	-0.32
	(0.55)	(0.52)					(0.62)	(0.54)
Reg (SIP)			0.77	0.60	0.16	0.34		
			(0.89)	(0.86)	(0.94)	(0.87)		
Population	0.06	-0.01	0.08	0.01	0.10	0.04	0.08	0.03
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Terrain	-0.07	-0.13	-0.14	-0.19	-0.08	-0.14	-0.03	-0.11
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)
State age	0.98**	0.96**	1.02***	1.01**	0.92**	0.99**	0.93**	1.02**
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.35)
Inequality		-0.01		0.00		0.03		0.02
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)
peace yrs	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	-0.00
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)
cubic sp_ 1	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
cubic sp_ 2	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
cubic sp_ 3	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-5.15**	-3.71	-5.77**	-4.93	-9.74***	-9.98**	-10.22***	-9.86**
	(1.53)	(3.03)	(1.64)	(2.98)	(2.49)	(3.28)	(2.75)	(3.46)
Ps. R2	0.18	0.20	0.18	0.20	0.17	0.19	0.17	0.19
chi2	159.736	192.713	174.724	201.727	199.423	207.399	200.521	212.805
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	2970	2588	2908	2533	2971	2568	3031	2624

Multinomial regression (territorial vs. peace results not reported); standard errors in parentheses; † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table B4. Replication of Table 3 in the paper, with two measures of GDP, regime type and the DV based on Sambanis. Territorial vs. Non-territorial Conflicts (0=Territorial Conflicts).

SAMBANIS	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>	<i>M3</i>	<i>M4</i>	<i>M5</i>	<i>M6</i>	<i>M7</i>	<i>M8</i>
GDP pc FL	0.21*	0.16*	0.14†	0.13†				
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)				
GDP PPP					0.71*	0.66*	0.84*	0.76*
					(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.31)
Reg. ACLP	-0.53	-0.50					-0.04	-0.16
	(0.54)	(0.52)					(0.64)	(0.57)
Reg. SIP			1.05	0.96	0.27	0.45		
			(0.80)	(0.77)	(0.87)	(0.80)		
Population	0.14	0.04	0.14	0.05	0.18	0.11	0.19	0.12
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Terrain	-0.03	-0.08	-0.11	-0.14	-0.01	-0.06	0.05	-0.01
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.24)
State age	0.99**	0.94**	1.09***	1.08***	0.84**	0.89*	0.78*	0.81*
	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.36)
Inequality		-0.05		-0.02		0.00		-0.01
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)
Peace yrs	0.09	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.07	0.04
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Cubic sp_1	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Cubic sp_2	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Cubic sp_3	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-6.50***	-2.90	-7.04***	-4.79†	-11.53***	-10.58***	-12.78***	-10.63**
	(1.54)	(2.96)	(1.61)	(2.80)	(2.62)	(3.16)	(3.03)	(3.57)
Ps. R2	0.18	0.20	0.18	0.19				
chi2	166.298	190.302	165.249	186.560	182.444	187.374	202.149	206.774
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	2962	2583	2901	2532	2958	2566	3023	2619

Multinomial regression (territorial vs. peace results not reported); standard errors in parentheses; † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table B5. Replication of Table 4 with two measures of GDP and regime type, and the DV based on FL. Peace vs. Non-territorial Conflicts (0=Peace).

F&L	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8
GDPpc FL	0.38†	0.40*	0.38†	0.41*				
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.20)				
GDPpc Sq.	-0.04**	-0.03***	-0.04*	-0.04**				
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)				
GDPpc PPP					15.23***	12.51***	13.96***	11.68***
					(4.12)	(3.80)	(3.38)	(3.16)
GDPpc Sq.					-0.91***	-0.74***	-0.83***	-0.69***
					(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Reg ACLP	-0.83	-0.76					-0.87†	-0.75
	(0.54)	(0.50)					(0.52)	(0.49)
Reg SIP			1.45†	1.38†	1.55†	1.39†		
			(0.82)	(0.76)	(0.84)	(0.79)		
Population	0.49**	0.56***	0.54***	0.63***	0.65***	0.68***	0.59***	0.62***
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Terrain	0.29	0.25	0.24	0.19	0.22	0.19	0.29	0.27
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)
State age	0.57*	0.50*	0.59**	0.52*	0.51*	0.45†	0.46*	0.40†
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Inequality		0.06†		0.07*		0.06†		0.05
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
peace yrs	-0.37**	-0.36**	-0.35*	-0.34*	-0.34*	-0.33*	-0.36**	-0.36**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
cubic sp_1	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
cubic sp_2	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
cubic sp_3	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-11.00***	-13.93***	-12.60***	-15.93***	-75.62***	-67.06***	-68.80***	-61.94***
	(1.53)	(2.30)	(1.66)	(2.53)	(18.08)	(16.54)	(14.71)	(13.93)
Ps. R2	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.21
chi2	178.488	168.313	178.015	174.381	237.460	233.683	236.187	223.917
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	2970	2588	2908	2533	2971	2568	3031	2624

Multinomial regression (peace vs. territorial conflict results not reported); standard errors in parentheses; † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table B6. Replication of Table 4 with two measures of GDP, regime type, and the DV based on Sambanis. Peace vs. Non-territorial Conflicts (0=Peace).

Sambanis	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8
GDP FL	0.41*	0.44*	0.42*	0.47*				
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.20)				
GDP2 FL	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.04**				
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)				
GDP PPP					14.93***	12.65***	13.51***	11.48***
					(4.03)	(3.77)	(3.16)	(3.02)
GDP2 PPP					-0.89***	-0.74***	-0.80***	-0.67***
					(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Reg. ACLP	-0.69	-0.62					-0.71	-0.60
	(0.50)	(0.45)					(0.49)	(0.45)
Reg. SIP			1.31†	1.23†	1.37†	1.22†		
			(0.74)	(0.68)	(0.77)	(0.72)		
Population	0.48**	0.54***	0.52***	0.59***	0.63***	0.65***	0.58***	0.61***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Terrain	0.27	0.22	0.22	0.16	0.19	0.16	0.26	0.24
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)
State age	0.59*	0.54*	0.61**	0.56*	0.52*	0.46†	0.48*	0.42†
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Inequality		0.06*		0.07*		0.06†		0.05†
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Peace yrs	-0.40**	-0.40**	-0.38**	-0.38**	-0.37*	-0.37*	-0.39**	-0.40**
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Cubic sp_1	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Cubic sp_2	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Cubic sp_3	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-10.98***	-13.84***	-12.41***	-15.55***	-74.38**	-67.71***	-67.17***	-61.39***
	(1.57)	(2.24)	(1.63)	(2.30)	(17.69)	(16.61)	(13.82)	(13.36)
Ps. R2	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.21
chi2	201.888	177.306	191.263	181.672	211.656	215.259	223.283	216.852
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	2962	2583	2901	2532	2958	2566	3023	2619

Multinomial regression (peace vs. territorial conflict results not reported); standard errors in parentheses; † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table B7. Table 3 in paper, with a different time specification (Brevity instead of Peace Years and Cubic Splines), and different measures of regime type and GDP. DV based on Fearon and Laitin. Territorial vs. Non-territorial Conflicts (0=Territorial conflict).

F&L	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8
GDP pc FL	0.26**	0.22*	0.22*	0.21*				
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)				
GDP pc PPP					0.70*	0.61*	0.65*	0.61*
					(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.31)
Reg. ACLP	-0.35	-0.36			-0.02	-0.16		
	(0.53)	(0.51)			(0.60)	(0.54)		
Reg. SIP			0.48	0.35			-0.04	0.10
			(0.80)	(0.78)			(0.86)	(0.80)
Population	0.06	-0.02	0.08	-0.01	0.09	0.02	0.11	0.03
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.16)
Terrain	-0.04	-0.09	-0.10	-0.13	0.00	-0.06	-0.05	-0.08
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.23)
State age	0.96**	0.94**	0.98**	0.96**	0.91**	0.98**	0.88**	0.94**
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.35)
Inequality		-0.02		-0.01		0.02		0.02
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Brevity	0.61	0.64	0.90	0.94	0.63	0.60	0.96	0.92
	(0.64)	(0.66)	(0.65)	(0.67)	(0.65)	(0.67)	(0.65)	(0.68)
Constant	-5.85***	-3.94	-6.41***	-4.92	-11.20***	-10.43**	-10.96***	-10.55**
	(1.59)	(3.05)	(1.62)	(2.90)	(2.83)	(3.62)	(2.60)	(3.43)
Ps. R2	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.20	0.17	0.19	0.17	0.19
chi2	141.688	183.211	148.130	185.366	182.358	204.424	177.545	199.757
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	2970	2588	2908	2533	3031	2624	2971	2568

Multinomial regression (peace vs. territorial conflict results not reported); standard errors in parentheses; † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table B8. Table 4 in paper, with a different time specification (Brevity instead of Peace Years and Cubic Splines), and different measures of regime type and GDP. DV based on Fearon and Laitin. Peace vs. Non-territorial Conflicts (0=Peace).

F&L	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8
GDP pc FL	0.39*	0.41*	0.40*	0.43*				
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.19)				
GDP2 FL	-0.04**	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.04**				
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)				
GDP PPP					13.49***	11.54***	14.41***	12.12***
					(3.20)	(3.07)	(3.74)	(3.54)
GDP2 PPP					-0.80***	-0.68***	-0.86***	-0.72***
					(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Reg. ACLP	-0.69	-0.65			-0.72	-0.64		
	(0.50)	(0.47)			(0.49)	(0.46)		
Reg. SIP			1.24†	1.19†			1.30†	1.18†
			(0.74)	(0.69)			(0.74)	(0.70)
Population	0.50**	0.56***	0.54***	0.61***	0.59***	0.62***	0.63***	0.67***
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Terrain	0.31†	0.28	0.27	0.23	0.31	0.30	0.26	0.24
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)
State age	0.57*	0.50*	0.57**	0.50*	0.46*	0.40	0.49*	0.42†
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Inequality		0.06†		0.06*		0.05		0.05
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Brevity	2.30***	2.36***	2.40***	2.47***	2.31***	2.33***	2.39***	2.42***
	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.57)
Constant	-13.41***	-16.05***	-14.84***	-17.75***	-69.38***	-63.72***	-74.53***	-67.51***
	(1.60)	(2.30)	(1.66)	(2.43)	(13.86)	(13.37)	(16.25)	(15.32)
Ps. R2	0.18	0.20	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.20
chi2	155.344	158.077	149.789	161.679	224.984	214.833	224.977	225.423
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	2970	2588	2908	2533	3031	2624	2971	2568

Multinomial regression (peace vs. territorial conflict results not reported); standard errors in parentheses; † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table B9. Replication of model 1 in table 3 with the sequential drop of the countries with non-territorial conflicts.

Country dropped	Fearon & Laitin				Sambanis			
	GDP per capita	std. Err.	regime	std. Err.	GDP per capita	std. Err.	regime	std. Err.
India	0.27**	0.10	-0.22	0.60	0.26**	0.10	-0.13	0.63
Leshoto	0.25**	0.10	-0.55	0.55	0.22*	0.10	-0.61	0.59
Pakistan	0.24*	0.10	-0.59	0.62	0.21*	0.10	-0.60	0.68
Honduras	0.25**	0.10	-0.62	0.56	0.22*	0.10	-0.67	0.59
Egypt	0.25**	0.10	-0.60	0.56	0.23*	0.10	-0.66	0.60
Thailand	0.25**	0.10	-0.60	0.56	0.23*	0.10	-0.57	0.61
Turkey	0.25**	0.10	-0.55	0.57	0.22*	0.10	-0.52	0.61
Ecuador	0.25**	0.10	-0.46	0.57	0.21*	0.10	-0.63	0.60
Colombia	0.25**	0.10	-0.47	0.57	0.21*	0.10	-0.79	0.60
South Africa	0.25**	0.10	-0.67	0.58	0.22*	0.09	-0.69	0.58
Chile	0.24*	0.10	-0.65	0.54	0.21*	0.10	-0.62	0.62
Mexico	0.24*	0.10	-0.56	0.58	0.23*	0.10	-0.50	0.60
Portugal	0.26**	0.10	-0.45	0.56	0.26*	0.10	-0.59	0.62
Iran	0.31**	0.10	-0.47	0.58	0.23*	0.10	-0.49	0.59
Greece	0.26**	0.10	-0.43	0.55	0.20*	0.09	-0.82	0.58
Argentina	0.23*	0.10	-0.74	0.54	0.21*	0.10	-0.54	0.63
Israel	0.24*	0.10	-0.47	0.58	0.19*	0.09	-0.92†	0.53
Spain	0.22*	0.10	-0.84†	0.50	0.22*	0.10	-0.58	0.62
UK	0.24*	0.10	-0.51	0.57	0.22*	0.10	-0.56	0.59
Italy	0.25*	0.10	-0.51	0.55	0.21*	0.10	-0.59	0.59
France	0.24*	0.10	-0.54	0.55	0.22*	0.10	-0.60	0.60
USA	0.25*	0.10	-0.53	0.56	0.24*	0.11	-0.65	0.61
Iraq	0.23*	0.10	-0.66	0.55	0.22*	0.10	-0.57	0.61
Germany	0.24*	0.10	-0.51	0.56	0.23*	0.10	-0.65	0.61

Table B10. Replication of model 1 in table 4 with the sequential dropout of the countries with non-territorial conflicts.

Country dropped	Fearon & Laitin						Sambanis					
	GDP per capita	std. Err.	GDP Sq	std. Err.	regime	std. Err.	GDP per capita	std. Err.	GDP Sq.	std. Err.	regime	std. Err.
India	0.44*	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.48	0.56	0.52*	0.22	-0.04**	0.02	-0.32	0.58
Leshoto	0.38†	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.83	0.54	0.57*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.62	0.52
Pakistan	0.42*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.72	0.60	0.51*	0.22	-0.04**	0.02	-0.52	0.58
Honduras	0.42*	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.91†	0.54	0.52*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.70	0.52
Egypt	0.40*	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.88	0.55	0.51*	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.67	0.53
Thailand	0.40*	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.88†	0.54	0.49*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.55	0.53
Turkey	0.39*	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.78	0.56	0.47*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.55	0.54
Ecuador	0.38†	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.77	0.56	0.44*	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.64	0.53
Colombia	0.37†	0.20	-0.03**	0.01	-0.76	0.56	0.44*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.77	0.54
South Africa	0.34†	0.20	-0.03*	0.01	-0.98†	0.55	0.47*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.72	0.51
Chile	0.37†	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.95†	0.52	0.49*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.56	0.55
Mexico	0.40†	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.77	0.57	0.47*	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.53	0.52
Portugal	0.38†	0.19	-0.03**	0.01	-0.74	0.54	0.45*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.67	0.55
Iran	0.36†	0.20	-0.03*	0.01	-0.87	0.56	0.45*	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.50	0.51
Greece	0.36†	0.19	-0.03**	0.01	-0.71	0.53	0.46*	0.22	-0.04**	0.02	-0.85†	0.50
Argentina	0.38†	0.20	-0.04*	0.01	-1.04*	0.52	0.41*	0.20	-0.03**	0.01	-0.56	0.55
Israel	0.32†	0.19	-0.03*	0.01	-0.76	0.57	0.38*	0.19	-0.03*	0.01	-0.88†	0.49
Spain	0.29†	0.19	-0.03*	0.01	-1.08*	0.51	0.45*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.59	0.54
UK	0.36†	0.20	-0.03*	0.01	-0.80	0.56	0.45*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.59	0.52
Italy	0.36†	0.20	-0.03*	0.01	-0.81	0.54	0.52*	0.22	-0.04**	0.02	-0.63	0.51
France	0.43*	0.21	-0.04*	0.02	-0.84†	0.53	0.55*	0.24	-0.05*	0.02	-0.66	0.52
USA	0.45†	0.24	-0.04*	0.02	-0.86	0.54	0.42*	0.20	-0.04**	0.01	-0.72	0.53
Iraq	0.33†	0.19	-0.03*	0.01	-0.93†	0.54	0.46*	0.21	-0.04*	0.02	-0.59	0.53
Germany	0.37†	0.20	-0.04*	0.01	-0.80	0.54	0.50*	0.21	-0.04**	0.01	-0.66	0.54

Table B11. Alternative estimation methods for the base model in Table 4.

	Relogit	Relogit	XtProbit	XtProbit
GDP pc	0.43*	0.42*	0.27*	0.28*
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.13)
GDP pc 2	-0.03*	-0.04*	-0.02*	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Reg. ACLP	-0.61		-0.19	
	(0.51)		(0.22)	
Reg. SIP		1.19		0.40
		(0.76)		(0.27)
Population	0.48***	0.52***	0.25**	0.26**
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Terrain	0.27	0.22	0.15	0.13
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.10)
State ge	0.48*	0.49*	0.29†	0.26†
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Peace yrs	-0.66**	-0.63*	-0.30**	-0.28*
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Cubic sp_1	-0.02*	-0.02†	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Cubic sp_2	0.01†	0.01	0.01*	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Cubic sp_3	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-10.63***	-11.85***	-6.22***	-6.44***
	(1.24)	(1.39)	(1.43)	(1.37)
lnsig2u			-1.57	-1.78
			(1.10)	(1.27)
chi2			33.646	35.353
p			0.000	0.000
N	3474	3354	3454	3354

Standard errors in parentheses; † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001