THE DOMESTIC TERRORIST VICTIMS (DTV) DATASET CODEBOOK

Version 1-2009

DTV Project (www.march.es/dtv)¹

Centre for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (Juan March Institute), Madrid (www.march.es/ceacs)

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1. Introduction

The present dataset contains all the killings by domestic terrorist groups in Western European countries during the period 1965-2005. The unit of observation is the victim, not the attack. We include all victims in Europe as long as there is information about the political orientation of the killing and/or information about the group responsible for the killing. We only consider to be victims of terrorist violence those deaths that are a direct consequence of a terrorist attack. For instance, we exclude people who die of a heart attack that could be related to terrorist attacks. Terrorists who die manipulating their own explosives are also excluded, because they are not considered victims (no one kills them). However, terrorists who are killed by members of their own organization or by rival organizations are included.

The operational criterion that it is used to distinguish terrorist killings from other killings is the following: terrorist violence is that carried out by underground groups with political motivations. This excludes killings by underground groups without political motivations (e.g. the mafia, narco groups) and killings by organizations that liberate territory from a state's control and become guerrilla insurgencies, as they have different dynamics of violence to that of underground groups. For a more elaborate discussion on this actor-based concept of terrorism, see Sánchez-Cuenca and De la Calle (2009).

Domestic -as opposed to inter or transnational- terrorism, means in the present context that the nationality of the terrorists is that of the country in which they attack, regardless of the nationality of the victim (Engene 2007: 111-2). There are a few cases in which some terrorist groups such as the PIRA, ETA, and the Red Army Fraction acted outside their national borders. Although these few cases do not strictly fit the previous definition, we have introduced them for the sake of comprehensiveness. If the researcher is interested in identifying these cases, it can be easily done by crosstabulating the country (2.9) and the authorship (2.10) variables.

Regarding the sources and the procedures that were followed to collect the data, see Section 4 below on sources.

In the codebook we usually refer to terrorist groups by their acronyms. The Appendix contains information about these acronyms, including the full name of the groups (in their vernacular languages as well as in English), country in which they were based, their ideological type, and their total number of killings.

2. Variables

2.1. <i>Id</i>	
Identification nur	mber for each victim.

 $2.2 \ Year^2$

Year of the attack.

2.3. *Month*

Month of the attack.

2.4. *Day*

Day of the attack.

2.5. *Name*

Last and first names of the victim, when available. Only in 95 cases (0.98%) we did not find information about the name of the victim, though there was sufficient information about the killing to be sure that it had occurred.

2.6. Gender

Gender of the victim.

- 0. Male
- 1. Female.

2.7. Age

Age of the victim.

² With regard to the date of the attack (year / month / day), we report the day on which the attack took place, even if the victim died some time later as a result of the attack. In a few exceptional cases, there may be a lapse of several years between the attack and the eventual death. We include these cases where there is evidence (forensic or judicial) that connects the attack with the posterior death.

2.8. *City*

String variable. City in which the attack took place. Sometimes the killing occurs in a road, or in the countryside. In those cases, the closest municipality is used. When there was no information about the municipality, information about the county or province, if available, was used.

2.9. Country

The country in which the attack took place:

- 10. Austria
- 11. Belgium
- 12. Denmark
- 13. France
- 14. Finland
- 15. Germany
- 16. Greece
- 17. Iceland
- 18. Ireland
- 19. Italy
- 20. Luxembourg
- 21. Netherlands
- 22. Norway
- 23. Portugal
- 24. Spain
- 25. Sweden
- 26. Switzerland
- 27. United Kingdom

2.10. Authorship

This variable refers to the group responsible for the killing. The list of codes and some basic information about the groups appears in the Appendix. The first two numbers of the authorship code correspond to the country the terrorist group belongs to. Thus, Spain has code 24 and the code for ETA-m is 24001.

In a few cases, we were able to identify the ideological orientation of the terrorist killing, but were unable to attribute it to a particular group. In those few cases, we refer generically to the ideological family to which the perpetrators belong, always specifying the country of origin (for instance, Neonazi activists (Sweden), or Basque nationalists (Spain)).

2.11. Violencetype

We have distinguished three forms of political violence: organized terrorism, diffuse terrorism and politically-motivated urban violence. The boundary is sometimes blurred, but it was necessary to make a distinction. "Organized terrorism" refers to those killings carried out by organizations, which are planned to a certain degree. There is an organizational structure whose leadership plans and claims responsibility for the attacks carried out by its members. The typical technique of violence in this case is the bomb.

Then we have "diffuse terrorism", that is, those killings carried out by groups without a hierarchical organization. The organization is fully horizontal, it may be a network of activists or cells. This is typically the case in neonazi, racist groups, but also in some leftist groups whose ideological beliefs lead them to renounce a hierarchical organization. These groups are usually less lethal than those that are fully organized.

Finally, there is "street political violence", which includes more or less "spontaneous" killings carried out by mobs or gangs.³ Typically, a non-planned incident sparks a violent reaction that ends up in a killing. The technology of violence these groups use is rudimentary: very often, the victims are stabbed or beaten rather than shot or killed by a bomb explosion.

- 0. Urban political violence
- 1. Diffuse terrorism
- 2. Organized Terrorism

2.12. *Ideology*

This variable codifies the ideological orientation of the perpetrators. For a more detailed discussion of these categories, see Sánchez-Cuenca and De la Calle (2009).

- 0. Vigilante (against secession)
- 1. Nationalist (pro-secession)
- 2. Extreme-left
- 3. Extreme-right
- 4. Neonazi

2.13. *Method*

Technique used by the terrorists to kill the victim.

- 1. Shooting
- 2. Bomb (plus mortars, mines, parcel bombs, etc.)
- 3. Car bomb
- 4. Others (stabbing, beating, etc. –no firearms)

2.14. Deathtoll

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³ We exclude cases without a clear political orientation, such as killings perpetrated by social outcasts, gangs, or sports hooligans, motivated by revenge or for the mere sake of violence.

Number of people killed in the terrorist attack. See also 2.19.

2.15. Claim

This variable contains information on whether the attack was claimed for or not. It may happen that, under certain circumstances, the attack develops in such a way that the claim is unnecessary (for instance, if a terrorist is killed in the attack, or arrested after it, or if the attack is executed in such a way that leaves no doubt about authorship. All these cases are codified as "yes". It might be described as a "claim by default".)

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. False
- 4. Multiple

2.16. *Status*

Status of the victim. One problem with the status variable is that of people who change status. For instance, a member of the police who has retired and is killed in a terrorist attack. If the person was killed because he or she was in the police in the past, then this person is classified as police even if at the time of the killing they were not part of the police any longer. If, on the other hand, the person dies in an indiscriminate attack or as a collateral victim, then the person is classified under the category "other civilians". The final decision, therefore, is context-based. However, these "complicated" cases occur rarely.

- 1. Military
- 2. Police (including private security guards)⁴
- 3. Paramilitaries (and former paramilitaries)
- 4. Politicians and public officials
- 5. Entrepreneurs
- 6. Other civilians

2.17. Selectivity

This variable measures the degree of selectivity of the attack in the following way.

- 1. Individual (selective) killings (behaviour based)
- 2. State killing (security forces and State officials)
- 3. Social group killing (social traits)
- 4. Society killing
- 5. Collateral killing
- 6. Mistake

⁴ In many countries, the State authorizes private agents to bear arms and to do policing activities. We include all private police activities as part of the security forces.

This classification merits some clarification, as the scheme we develop is original. De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (forthcoming) contains a more thorough discussion. A brief explanation about each category is provided below.

- Individual killings are behaviour based. That means that terrorists targeted the victim because of her behaviour rather than due to her job or social characteristics (for instance, a Catholic person killed by the PIRA because the terrorists think that the target was an informer, or an entrepreneur killed by ETA because he or she did not pay the extortion money demanded by the terrorists). We codified killings as "individual" or "selective" when there was some evidence that the target was chosen because of some particular behaviour. We include someone in this category when there is judicial evidence, statements by relatives of the victim, or accusations made by the terrorists against the victim. If terrorists kill members of their own potential support constituency (e.g., Catholics targeted by Republican armed groups) and there is no good information to discern the reason for the attack, then we assume in these cases that terrorists had information to carry out the attack on a "selective" basis.
- Next we consider attacks aimed at particular groups of society regardless of the specific behaviour of their members. We distinguish two broad groups: attacks against individuals working for the state ("state-based" killings), and individuals targeted because they held some specific social traits -such as religion, ideology or ethnicity- that terrorists consider inimical to their goals ("social-group based" or "sectarian"). Killings of individuals who work for the State are codified as "State-based" killings. Police forces, military, judges, prison officers and government officials, -that is, decision-makers, civil-servants and members of the security forces- are included in this category. One exception is when terrorists make intra-group distinctions. For instance, if terrorists only attack a segment of the political spectrum consistently defined by their specific "social-based" traits, then we consider those killed politicians as "social-group" killings and not "State-based" ones. (See Section 3 below for a more detailed explanation).
- We have next the killings of those individuals who belong to social groups characterized by ideological or religious features. In this case, the victim is targeted neither because of her behaviour nor because of her job; she is targeted because she belongs to a social group that terrorists see as contrary to their interests. Thus, terrorists can consider an individual's membership within an ethnic group or an ideological movement as a relevant trait that justifies her killing regardless of the salience this trait has for the victim. Hence, attacks against social groups bear a sectarian component, since the targets are selected independently of the particular stance of the victim against the terrorists. A special case is that of "paramilitaries". As we do not consider "paramilitary" activity as a job on its own, the killing of paramilitaries carried out by terrorist organizations is coded as "social group" killings.
- We code as "society" killings those attacks which are aimed at any member of society, regardless of her behaviour, job, or social traits. The paradigmatic example is a bomb exploding in a train station or a public square. This category can be regarded as a default one when the target is not defined by any of the other categories (behaviour, state job, or social group); then it is a society killing. Nevertheless, the boundary between "social-group" targets and "society" ones is sometimes blurred. Only when we have been unable to find a clear

- indication that the attack is aimed at a particular (ideological, ethnic) group do we codify it as a "society" killing.
- Collateral killings are the unintended result of attacks aimed at another target. Thus, we code an attack as "collateral" when there is good information to rule out that the victim was the target of the terrorists, or when we know that the target was someone else.
- Finally, mistakes are attacks where the terrorists recognize they targeted the wrong person due to an intelligence failure. Unlike "collateral" killings, the victim in this case was indeed the target of the attack, but she was wrongly selected.

2.18. Strategy

This variable measures the strategic goal of the attack.

- 1. Influence
- 2. Sectarian
- 3. Security

The following comments are in order.

- We leave out collateral victims and mistakes, since they are unplanned killings from the viewpoint of the terrorists. These are missing values in the strategy variable.
- Based on the distinction between influence and security killings (McCormick 2003), we examine in each case whether the attack was aimed at achieving influence (i.e., the capacity to pursue the goal that the organization seeks to achieve) or at providing security (i.e., the capacity of the terrorist group to reproduce and expand, which requires avoiding denunciations, fighting against competitor and inimical groups, obtaining finances, and gaining new recruits and more generally social support). Individual or selective attacks are all classified as security killings. By contrast, State and society killings are classified as influence-seeking. The problematic case is that of "social-group" killings, which have both elements of security and influence. Hence, we have reserved a special category for this mixed case –the sectarian goal.⁵

2.19. Attack

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This is a numeric code for each attack. The numeric value is arbitrary; it is merely instrumental for grouping together all killings that come from the same attack. In fact, most attacks only have one victim, but in some case a single attack may cause many fatalities. This variable is useful to calculate the mean number of fatalities per attack in different terrorist organizations. More importantly, this variable may be used to change the unit of observation of the dataset, replacing killings by attacks. As many other

⁵ An interesting case, mentioned above, is that of attacks against ideologically-inimical political party members. We consider these cases sectarian in nature: individuals are targeted here because of their ideology.

ir	nto an attack-based o	lataset.		

datasets are attack-based, some researchers may be interested in transforming the DTV

3. Coding Illustrations for the Selectivity and Strategy Variables

To help the reader to understand how we code the selectivity and the strategy variables, we discuss six illustrations of terrorist violence from Italy, Great Britain and Spain (see table 1 below). We have also included some additional items (date of the killing, place, authorship and status of the victim) to provide contextual information. These illustrations represent a mix of clear and not so clear cases. For instance, the case of Michael Madden, shot by the PIRA, is rather obvious: he was a Catholic civilian and the PIRA claimed that he was an informer. Thus, we consider this killing to be behaviour-based in the selectivity variable and a security attack in the strategy variable. The case of Nigel McCollum, also killed by the PIRA, is more problematic. Mortar bombs were thrown into an army base, killing this civilian, who happened to be there driving a crane. Here we have to make an informed guess: our conjecture is that the PIRA, by throwing mortar bombs into an army base, intended to kill army personnel and not civilians. Therefore, we consider that McCollum was a collateral victim of an attack (hence, we do not codify the strategic aim in this case).

ETA-m admitted that the killing of Julián Galarza was a mistake. The terrorists thought that he was the mayor of a small village. In terms of codification, this is a civilian, a mistake and of no value in terms of strategy. Nicola Buffi was a civilian killed in an indiscriminate attack by a Fascist bomb. The strategy was to gain influence and generate social chaos. Agustín Muñoz was a general of the army killed by the GRAPO: a soldier, a State-based killing aimed at gaining influence.

Perhaps the most controversial case in Table 1 is that of Aldo Moro, the President of *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC) who was kidnapped and killed. In their communiqués, the Red Brigades said that it represented an attack on the core of the State (il cuore dello Stato, see Progetto Memoria 1996: 130). Yet, we have considered the killing of Moro to be a group-based sectarian attack and not an attack against people who work for the State with the aim of increasing influence. First, Moro had no role at that moment in the Government (in the past, he had been minister in several governments and prime minister during the periods 1964-8 and 1974-6). Secondly, the DC was targeted by the Red Brigades and other revolutionary terrorist organizations. On 29 March 1979, the Red Brigades killed Italo Schettino, another member of the DC without any post in the Administration or the Government. There were some other similar attacks. Thirdly, in the first communiqué of the Moro affair, the Red Brigades explicitly said that "the Communist vanguard has some time ago identified the DC as the most ferocious enemy of the proletariat" (Progetto Memoria 1996: 111). This statement seems to confirm the idea that any member of the DC was a target for the Red Brigades. If we take this seriously, it implies that attacks against the DC had an undeniable sectarian content.

We have highlighted here the case of Aldo Moro because it is well-known and exemplifies the kind of hard choices that sometimes have to be made in the codification of the killings. In order to minimize any subjective element, we have tried to make explicit the rules that we follow in difficult cases such as this one.

Table 1: Some Illustrations of codification.

Name of the victim	Date of the killing	Place	Authorship	Status of the victim	Selectivity	Strategy	Circumstances of the killing
Madden, Michael	25 April 1980	Belfast (Northern Ireland -UK)	PIRA (Ethno- nationalist)	Civilian (Catholic)	Behaviour- based	Security	He was shot six times at his home. The PIRA claimed he had given information to the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
McCollum, Nigel	8 March 1993	Armagh (Northern Ireland)	PIRA (Ethno- nationalist)	Civilian (Protestant)	Collateral		He was driving a crane in an army base when he was killed by the explosion of mortar bombs. He had no relationship with the army.
Galarza, Julián	10 Feb. 1976	Cizurquil (Basque Country - Spain)	ETAm (Ethno- nationalist)	Civilian	Mistake		The terrorists confused this person with the mayor of the village. They apologized for the mistake.
Buffi, Nicola	4 Aug. 1974	Italy	Ordine Nero (Fascist)	Civilian	Society- based	Influence	He and ten other people were killed when a bomb exploded in the train "Italicus."
Muñoz, Agustín	5 March 1979	Madrid (Spain)	GRAPO (Revolutionary)	Military	State-based	Influence	An army general.
Moro, Aldo	9 May 1978	Rome (Italy)	Brigate Rosse (Revolutionary)	Civilian	Group- based	Sectarian	He was the President of <i>Democrazia Cristiana</i> . After 55 days of being kidnapped, he was killed.

4. Sources and data gathering

Most datasets collect information on terrorism based on international press and news agencies. This is unavoidable if the dataset is to have global coverage, including most countries in the world. The side effect is a serious problem of under-reporting, which may introduce bias into the data.

We have drawn on as many sources as possible for each conflict and terrorist organization. The accuracy of our data stems from the cross-checking of multiple sources, most of which were at country-level. Experience has taught us that country-level information is absolutely crucial to obtaining detailed information about terrorist conflicts. In some cases, of course, this requires checking sources in different languages. Given the Western European scope of the dataset, we have checked information in Catalan, English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish.

In some cases, there were already datasets of killings. In some other cases, we have found lists of victims, chronologies, and documents prepared by associations of victims of terrorism, NGOs, web pages dedicated to the memory of victims, local press reports, official lists of victims by state institutions, monographs on terrorist organizations, and even documents produced by terrorist organizations themselves or by political organizations somehow linked to the terrorists.

We present sources for all the cases in which there was evidence of terrorist killings. We do not report on negative findings, that is, searches that ended with no killings. But a comment on how we proceeded is in order here. First, we looked at the existing datasets based on newspaper information. Thus, we checked for each country Engene's (2007) TWEED dataset, which only covers Western Europe, as well as GTD1, the Global Terrorism Database, 1970-1997, compiled by Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan from the information filed by Pinkerton agency. TWEED and GTD1 are the only existing cross-country datasets on domestic terrorism. If there was no result about killings, then we checked web pages on terrorist and armed organizations, literature on terrorism, as well as literature on violence in each country (based on availability). It is worth noting that we found many false positives both in TWEED and GTD1, that is, attacks that were in fact carried out by international, not domestic organizations, or violence which was not terrorist in nature (e.g. bank robberies without any political motivation). Other general sources we have checked in this first stage of the search are the on-line datasets of the Israeli International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT, http://ict.org.il), which is not available any more, and of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (the French Base de Données sur les Actes Terroristes, available at https://bdt.frstrategie.org/, which contains data for countries that are under the area of interest of France).

Once we found evidence about killings, we started the search for country-level sources. Sources are commented upon below according to the type of terrorism (nationalist or territorial, leftwing or rightwing) and country.

4.1. Nationalist terrorism

Taking into account that the Troubles in Northern Ireland and the Basque conflict add up to 76% of all killings in Western Europe, we start with these two conflicts. We then move to minor conflicts.

4.1.1. The Troubles in Northern Ireland

As far as we know, there are three exhaustive datasets regarding the fatalities of the Troubles. The unit of observation in each case is the victim (as in the DTV), not the attack. Each victim is registered with as much information as possible, including name and last name. One of the dataset is in electronic format, the second one is on-line, and the third is on paper. The electronic dataset is the Costs of the Troubles Study dataset (CTS, more information at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/cts/). We used the file of this dataset as the starting point for our inquiries. For anonymity reasons, the name of the victim was removed from the file. But we matched each case with other datasets and were thus able to introduce the name of the victims. Next, we checked each observation with the two other datasets. On the one hand, the on-line data from the Michael Sutton's 1994 Index of Deaths in the CAIN web page (Conflict Archive on the Internet, www.cain.ulst.ac.uk). The CAIN site revised and extended the dataset up to the present. On the other, the monumental Lost Lives project (McKittrick et al. 1999). This book was revised and extended in later editions. It is a volume with more than 1,600, doublecolumn pages, with an entry for each victim. The entry provides detailed information about the circumstances and motivation of the killing, the verdict of the courts and the opinion of the security forces on authorship (when dubious), as well as biographical information. All this information has been crucial for the codification of the selectivity and strategy variables.

When there was a conflict between the sources, we have tended generally to give more credit to *Lost Lives*. Yet, if CAIN and CTS agreed against *Lost Lives*, we followed a majority rule, unless the evidence included in *Lost Lives* was overwhelming. The three sources employ a very broad definition of a victim. For instance, those terrorists who died while they were manipulating explosives are included. Likewise, people who died of a heart attack which in some way or another might be connected to the Troubles are also introduced. We have been stricter: we only consider victims of terrorism to be those who died as a direct consequence of terrorist attacks. If a paramilitary was the target of an attack, the person qualifies as victim, but not when he or she dies preparing a bomb.

4.1.2. The Basque Country

Regarding the victims of nationalist terrorism in the Basque Country, there was nothing similar in either accuracy or exhaustiveness to the datasets of Northern Ireland. We built our own dataset, with the victim as the unit of observation. This dataset, which contains many more variables than the DTV, has been used for different publications (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2004; Calleja and Sánchez-Cuenca 2006; Sánchez-Cuenca 2009b) and is publicly available at www.march.es/dtv. The codebook of this dataset contains information about the specific sources that were used. A complete description of sources can be found in Calleja and Sánchez-Cuenca (2006: 176-9).

⁶ McKeown (1989) was the first to record killings and to provide a quantitative analysis of fatalities. He registered 2,763 fatalities between 1969 and 1989.

⁷ All web addresses that are reported were checked for the last time in May 2009.

The dataset was built by cross-checking several sources. First, the existing lists of victims provided by the Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo (AVT, www.avt.org and published in Chalvidant 2003), the list of Calleja (1997), and the list prepared by the Ministry of Interior and reproduced in Pulgar (2004). There is also an on-line dataset that was developed by the Basque Government (http://interior.euskadi.net/datvt). However, all these sources contain numerous mistakes. Furthermore, we made thousands of searches in the leading national Spanish newspaper, *El País*, that has been digitalized since its foundation in May 1976. For the period before 1976, we checked the conservative national newspaper *ABC*. Newspaper information was crucial to eliminate some false cases and to unearth some others that were not registered in any of these lists.

Thirdly, we also used sources from ETA itself or from people close to the terrorist organization. Among other sources of information, these were particularly important: the book with the chronology of the years 1977-82 edited by ETA's newspaper, *Egin* (*Egin* 1982), and the full chronology of ETA's actions contained in Landa (1995). Finally, we read almost every book in which there was information about victims of ETA. Calleja and Sánchez-Cuenca (2006) include in the printed list of the victims of the dataset the pages in which these books refer to each victim.

All the information in the DTV about the Basque conflict comes from the original Victims of ETA dataset. Many variables from the original dataset were not included in the DTV. The reader with a particular interest in ETA should access the original dataset.

4.1.3. Corsica

We used the electronic dataset produced by the *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique* (the *Base de Données sur les Actes Terroristes*, available at https://bdt.frstrategie.org) as the starting point to code victims of nationalist terrorism on the island. We complemented this source with the killings imputed to Corsican nationalists in TWEED, and information from local sources, such as the chronology of events produced by the nationalist movement (available at http://storiacorsa.unita-naziunale.org/index.htm) and the archives of French newspapers (*L'Express*, *L'Humanité*, *Le Figaro*).

4.1.4. Minor conflicts

The most lethal of the minor conflicts is the one in South Tyrol. Only those killings that took place since 1965 are covered. Data come from Calvi, Ceci, Sessa and Vasaturo (2003). In Spain there were a number of small, nationalist organizations that tried to emulate ETA. Regarding those acting in Catalonia (FAC, EPOCA, and Terra Lliure), there is information about the killings on the web page of the Catalan Association of Victims of Terrorism (www.acvot.org). We also checked several books on Catalan radical nationalism, among which Bassa (2007) and Vera (1985) were particularly useful. Bassa (2007) contains an exhaustive chronology of all armed actions. For minor organizations in Galicia and the Canary Islands, we used the information provided by the Ministry of Interior (Pulgar 2004). We also found in our searches in *El País* a single victim claimed by the mysterious FRAVA organization. Finally, the *Armée Révolutionnaire Bretonne* killed a single person, according to Henry and Lagadec (2006). An additional source of information on nationalism in Brittany is Le Quilliec (1997).

4.2. Left-wing terrorism

All the killings corresponding to leftwing, revolutionary organizations come from the dataset used in Sanchez-Cuenca (2009a). This dataset also covers information for developed, non European countries (Canada, Japan, and United States; there were no victims in Australia or New Zealand), but only that corresponding to Western Europe has been used.

A brief overview of the sources in each country follows. Countries are again ordered by the number of killings.

4.2.1. Italy

Italian leftwing terrorist organizations are perhaps the most complicated case due to the enormous fragmentation. There were dozens of small, short-lived organizations and in some cases - particularly with those related to the *autonomia* movement - it was very hard to attribute authorship.

Curcio (1995) is a collective work with an entry for each victim of Italian revolutionary organizations. It contains very detailed (though incomplete) information. Calvi, Ceci, Sessa and Vasaturo's book (2003) is a comprehensive chronology of all political violence for the period 1945-2003. Casamassima (2007) provides an exhaustive, updated chronology of the Red Brigades' actions.

Apart from books, internet information was crucial here. Although many web pages were visited, the ones that were found to be most reliable and useful are:

http://www.cedost.it/. Web page of the *Centro di Documentazione Storico Politica su Stragismo, Terrorism e Violenza Politica.* Under the heading '*Portale della Memoria*', it contains an on-line dataset with the most detailed description of all political violence since the Second World War.

http://www.fondazionecipriani.it/. Web page of the *Fondazione Luigi Cipriani*. It provides a highly detailed chronology of political violence in Italy since 1943.

http://www.vittimeterrorismo.it/memorie/memorie.htm. Web page of the *Associazione Italiana Vittime del Terrorismo*. It contains a chronology with an entry for each victim. It is not exhaustive, but highly detailed information about the victims is included.

http://digilander.libero.it/gianni61dgl/attentati.htm. This web page contains another detailed chronology of all terrorist attacks (both left-wing and right-wing) in Italy.

4.2.2. Spain

Spain is the country most hit by leftwing terrorism after Italy. There was a Maoist organization, GRAPO, that was responsible for 84 killings; though there is very little information about it available. In English, the only reference is Alexander and Pluchinsky (1992). In order to get information about all the killings, we made systematic searches in *El País* and we checked more information in several books: Novales (1989) is a biographical reflection by a former member of the organization that sheds light on some crucial attacks and forced the correction of the "official" version of

the security forces; Gómez (1991) contains a chronology of GRAPO's attacks; and Castro (2000) is a PhD thesis on GRAPO that includes a detailed chronology. There were other small revolutionary organizations. We generated data based on systematic searches in *El País* and we cross-checked that information with the one coming from the Ministry of Interior (Pulgar 2004). And we also used some books and articles: on the MIL, see Rosés (2002); and on the FRAP, see Hermida (1997).

4.2.3. Germany

Germany is a well-researched country and it was not hard to find all the relevant information about killings by the extreme left. Feldman (1998) contains a list of all killings by revolutionary terrorist organizations in Germany for the period 1967-93. Reinders and Fritzsch (1995) includes a full chronology of actions by the terrorist organization 2nd June Movement.

Additionally, there are rigorous, well documented web pages:

<u>http://www.baader-meinhof.com/timeline/timeline.html</u>. A full chronology of the Red Army Faction in the most comprehensive web site about this terrorist organization.

http://www.nadir.org/nadir/archiv/PolitischeStroemungen/Stadtguerilla+RAF/R <u>AF/brd+raf/056.html</u>. A full chronology in German of actions and documents by the RAF.

http://www.bewegung.in/mate_chronologie.html. A full chronology of all the actions by the 2nd June Movement in a web page created by the heirs of this organization.

<u>http://www.corsipo.de/</u>. An online dataset with all German police officials killed since 1961.

http://web.archive.org/web/20070227053550/www.etext.org/Politics/Arm.The.S pirit/Guerrilla/Europe/Rote.Zora/mini-herstory.1988. An anonymous document written by an activist about the Revolutionary Cells and Rote Zora. It contains references to the actions carried out by these minor terrorist organizations.

4.2.4. Greece

Kassimeris (2001: Appendix 1) contains a full chronology of all attacks by the Revolutionary Organization 17th November. Corsun (1991) contains another chronology of attacks, although a less complete one.

4.2.5. Portugal

Given the proximity between Portugal and Spain, we took advantage of the digitalized collection of *El País* and a systematic search of the Forças Populares 25 Abril was carried out. In many cases we also found very valuable information in the tabloid *Correio da Manhà* (www.correiomanha.pt). We backed this up with a relevant literature review. Barra da Costa (2004) is the most comprehensive study on the 25th April Popular Forces, though it does not provide a detailed chronology. De Sousa (1992) is a memoir written by a former recruit with information about certain killings.

4.2.6. France

In France there were not many killings by leftwing organizations. The main organization, *Action Directe*, is well analyzed in Dartnell (1995), which contains detailed appendixes with all attacks and killings by this organization. See also a Maoist

web page with another highly detailed chronology of *Action Directe*, http://archivescommunistes.chez-alice.fr/nac-fs/fs11.html. Dartnell (1995) also provides information about killings by smaller terrorist groups such as NAPAP and BI. Schrifes (2004) is a MA thesis with a very useful chronology of all leftwing political violence in France during the 1970s and 1980s.

4.2.7. Belgium and Denmark

In Belgium the *Cellules Communistes Combattantes* killed two people. There is some literature on this organization and its killings: Alexander and Pluchinsky (1992: Ch.7), Jenkins (1990), and Laufer (1988). This organization still has a web page with a full chronology: http://www.cellulescommunistescombattantes.be/chronologie.htm.

In Denmark, Nils-Peter Gleditsch told one of us in personal communication about an obscure killing in 1988 by a leftwing gang. We found a reference about this killing in Arnheim (2003). More information can be found in an article of the Danish Wikipedia: http://da.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blekingegade-sagen.

4.3. Right-wing and neonazi terrorism

Due to the fact that right-wing terrorism is not associated to hierarchical organizations, but rather to networks and horizontal groups, it was much more difficult to find reliable information about the perpetrators of these killings. Authorship is less clear than in other cases and information about these killings is much scarcer. Fortunately, many, if not most of the killings, took place in recent years, so that many reports by governments and ONGs about xenophobic, neonazi, and radical right wing violence are available on the Internet. In many cases, it was very useful to search the country reports provided by the different national partners of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - better known as "RAXEN National Focal Points"- on issues regarding racism, xenophobia and related intolerances.

Despite that, the information we have obtained about these killings is, in general, of worse quality than the one on nationalist and leftwing terrorism.

We next comment on specific country sources. Countries are ordered by the number of killings.

4.3.1. Italy

In the case of Italy, fascist terrorism started in the late 1960s. For those killings related to the strategy of tension of the 1970s, we have used the same sources as the ones we describe for this country in section 2.1 on revolutionary terrorism. Apart from these sources, Fasanella & Grippo (2006) provides a list of all the victims of the indiscriminate attacks (*stragi*) of those years.

Regarding the recent wave of xenophobic, racist violence, we have relied mainly on a report containing a list of racist crimes written by Annamaria Rivera and Paola Andrisani, available at

http://www.cospe.it/uploads/documenti/allegati/rapporto 2002 su violenza razzista e n.pdf.

4.3.2. Spain

On the case of the state-sponsored vigilante terrorist group GAL, Woodworth (2001) has an appendix with a full chronology of all its actions. Regarding extreme right wing terrorism during the Spanish transition, we searched in the on-line archive of *El Pais* (www.elpais.es); we used most of the sources mentioned in section 1.2, particularly Pulgar (2004); and we cross-checked several of the lists that are posted on the Internet (e.g. http://www.angelfire.com/pq/terroristas/bve.htm). Rodríguez Jiménez (1997: Ch. 8) also contains useful information on right wing violence during the years of the transition to democracy.

Regarding more recent xenophobic, racist violence, we checked the press and we used an exhaustive list of crimes included in the report prepared by the *Movimiento contra la intolerancia* in 2008 (Informe Raxen: *El peligro de la xenophobia y de la violencia ultra*, available at http://www.movimientocontralaintolerancia.com/html/raxen/raxen.asp).

4.3.3. Germany

The most important source has been the annual reports on violence prepared by the newspaper *Tagespiegel* for the period 1990-2000. They are available on the Internet:

http://www.tagesspiegel.de/2052046;	http://www.tagesspiegel.de/2052063;
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/2052064;	http://www.tagesspiegel.de/2052065;
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/2052056;	http://www.tagesspiegel.de/2052060;
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/2052061;	http://www.tagesspiegel.de/2052066;
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/2052067;	http://www.tagesspiegel.de/2052068.

This information was also included in a list of fatalities published in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. A complete report based on this data, including the original list, can be found at http://www.opfer-rechter-gewalt.de/www/service/down/opfer-rechter-gewalt.pdf.

We completed the list of fatalities with the research made by Rebecca Forner for the 2008 exhibition "Victims of Right-Wing Violence Since 1990 in Germany" with the help of the non profit organization Opferperspektive, The list is available in www.opfer-rechter-gewalt.de/www/service/down/opfer-rechter-gewalt.pdf.

Also, the Rushton Report on victims of right wing violence for the period 1973-95 has been extremely useful. It is available at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/documents/rushton.htm.

4.3.4. United Kingdom

We made extensive use of the data provided by the Institute of Race Relations. More specifically, we drew information from two lists of killings for the periods 1991-99 and 2000-05 (available at www.irr.org.uk/2002/november/ak000002.html and www.irr.org.uk/2002/november/ak000008.html respectively).

We also used the report on racist violence in the UK prepared by Human Rights Watch (available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/uk2/).

We also checked several report on some killings that provoked official inquiries (e.g. *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm42/4262/sli-00.htm or the *Report of the Zahid Mubarek* (Inquiry available at http://www.zahidmubarekinquiry.org.uk/article3d65.html?c=374).

4.3.5. Belgium

Belgium has one of the most puzzling, mysterious campaigns of fascist terrorism in Western Europe, the so-called Brabant killings (Jenkins 1994). It is not even clear whether this violence was politically motivated, though there seems to be consensus that it was the Belgian manifestation of the strategy of tension. Though there is very little published on this group, there is a pretty exhaustive study, including a detailed chronology, available at http://users.skynet.be/leurquin/grandesenigmes/tueursbrab.htm.

For information about recent crimes, we checked data available at the mediatheque of the centre "Les Territoires de la Mémoire" (http://mediatheque.territoires-memoire.be/opac_css/index.php?lvl=author_see&id=15480). We want to thank Michel Recloux, service coordinator, for his help.

4.3.6. France

In this case, the *Base de Données sur les Actes Terroristes* (available at https://bdt.frstrategie.org/), which was mentioned above as one of the general sources for the initial search for killings, was particularly useful, as it covers France with great detail.

This has been complemented with searches in *Le Monde* and with several reports such as:

La Lutte contre le Racisme et la Xenophobie, Rapport d'Activité 2000, 2002 and 2005. Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme (Available at http://www.ladocumentationfrançaise.fr/rapports-

publics/034000129/index.shtml;

http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/014000277/0000.pdf; http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/064000264/0000.pdf)

Elimination du Racisme et de la Discrimination raciale (A/50/476), 25 septembre 1995. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Available at:

http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/2848af408d01ec0ac1256609004e770b/b4b6fdc0fd8619a18025671c00548f2b?OpenDocument

Commission d'Enquête sur les Agissements, l'Organisation, le Fonctionnement, les Objectifs du Groupement de fait dit « Département Protection Sécurité » et les Soutiens dont il bénéficierait. 1999. *Rapport n° 1622, 26 mai 1999*. Assemblée Nationale, France. Available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/dossiers/dps/r1622.pdf

4.3.7. Portugal

For rightwing violence during the period of the transition to democracy, we checked the report prepared by the Portuguese Communist Party (Anonimous 1977) and we found very detailed information in Damaso (1999).

Regarding xenophobic violence we searched for information of victims of extreme right wing violence in the tabloid *Correio da Manhà* (www.correiomanha.pt). We also found some information in *National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime. RAXEN Focal Point for Portugal* 2003, available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/CS-RV-NR-PT.pdf.

4.3.8. Sweden

There are several webpages that contain information about anti-Semitic and xenophobic violence:

The webpage Antisemitism and Xenophobia Today (AXT) contains a detailed report on Sweden in the nineties at http://www.axt.org.uk/antisem/archive/archive4/sweden/sweden.htm#On%20New%20Year's%20Eve%201999.

A report written by two researchers of Malmö University on racist violence in a community in Southern Sweden: it has data on fatalities. Available at www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=0011309165.pdf www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=0011309165.pdf www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=0011309165.pdf www.bra.se/extra/measurepoint/?module_instance=4&name=0011309165.pdf www.url=/dynamaster/file_archive/050124/6369e5a79c0122a4e5f61ef1756061d3/00111309165.pdf

A report prepared by an anti-fascist group with information about the most important killings in the last 15 years. Available at http://www.xs4all.nl/~afa/alert//engels/sweden.html

A country report undertaken by the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism in Tel Aviv University about Sweden for the years 1999 and 2000. Available at http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw99-2000/sweden.htm

Apart from these reports, we obtained further information from Klara Klingspor, research analyst at the National Council from Crime Prevention (http://www.bra.se).

4.3.9. Austria

The Austrian Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs issues an annual report on violent activities of all ideological kinds. These reports are available from 1997 at http://www.bmi.gv.at/staatsschutz/.

We also obtained information from Wilhem Lasek, a member of the Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (http://www.doew.at/), which covers, among other issues, extreme right wing groups.

4.3.10. Greece

Antigone, the Information & Documentation Centre on Racism, Ecology, Peace, and Non-Violence, and member of the RAXEN network of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, (www.antigone.gr/raxen_nfp/) contains annual reports on right wing violence as well as more detailed reports. Among these, we have specially used the one written by Ioannis D. Dimitrakopulos (available at http://www.antigone.gr/raxen_nfp/RacialViolenceRaxen3.pdf) and two prepared by Nassos Theodoridis, among others, who kindly sent these documents to us.

4.3.11. Switzerland

The Federal Office of Police publishes an annual, integral report on the internal security situation in Switzerland. These reports are available from 2001 at http://www.fedpol.admin.ch/fedpol/en/home/dokumentation/berichte.html

4.3.12. Norway

Regarding more recent xenophobic, racist violence in the case of Norway, we checked the press and several web sites, specially, a country report undertaken by the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism in Tel Aviv University about Norway for the years 2003 and 2004. Available at http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2003-4/norway.htm.

4.3.13. Ireland

The National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI), member of the RAXEN network of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights provides six-monthly racist incidents reports. These documents are available at http://www.nccri.ie/incidents-reports.html. We also found information in *National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime. RAXEN Focal Point for Ireland* 2003, available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/CS-RV-NR-IE.pdf

4.4. Vigilante terrorism

All cases of vigilante terrorism are part of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The sources we used are those that are specified in section 1.1.

Appendix. The Western European Terrorist Groups

					Type of	Number
Code	Name	Acronym	Translation	Country	terrorism	of killings
10001	Bayuvarische Befreiungs Armee	BAA	Bavarian Liberation Army	Austria	Extreme- right	4
11001	Cellules Communistes Combattantes	CCC	The Communist Combatant Cells	Belgium	Extreme- left	2
11010	De Bende van Nijvel		Brabant Killers	Belgium	Extreme- right	28
11011	National Front for the Liberation of Belgium	NFLB	National Front for the Liberation of Belgium	Belgium	Extreme- right	1
11015	Neo-Nazi extremists (Belgium)			Belgium	Neo-nazi	3
12001	Blekingegadebanden		The Blekinge Street Gang	Denmark	Extreme- left	1
13001	Front Nationale de Liberation Corse	FNLC	National Liberation Front of Corsica	France	Nationalist	16
13002	Front Nationale de Liberation Corse (Canal Habituale)	FNLC	National Liberation Front of Corsica -Usual Channel	France	Nationalist	13
13003	Front Nationale de Liberation Corse (Canal Historique)	FNLC	National Liberation Front of Corsica - Historical Channel	France	Nationalist	16
13004	Front Nationale de Liberation Corse (Union des Combattants)	FNLC- UC	National Liberation Front of Corsica- Union of Combatants	France	Nationalist	1
	Fronte Patriotu Corsu	FPC	Corsican Patriotic Front	France	Nationalist	2
	Sampieru		Sampieru	France	Nationalist	1
	Armata Corsa		Corsican Army	France	Nationalist	1
	Corsican nationalists			France	Nationalist	20
	Iparretarrak	IK	The ETA from the North	France	Nationalist	4
	Armeé Revolutionaire Breton	ARB	The Breton Revolutionary Army	France	Nationalist	1
	Action Directe	AD	Direct Action	France	Extreme- left	12
13021	Noyaux Armés pour l'Autonomie des Peuples (ou Populaire)	NAPAP	Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy	France	Extreme- left	1
13022	Brigade Internationale Raul Sendic	BI	International Brigade Raul Sendic	France	Extreme- left	2
13030	Club Charles Martel		Charles Martel Club	France	Extreme- right	4
13031	Organisation Delta		Delta Organization	France	Extreme- right	2
13032	Honneur de la Police	HP	Police Honor	France	Extreme- right	1
13033	Mouvement Nationaliste Revolutionnaire	MNR	Revolutionary Nationalist Movement	France	Extreme- right	1
13034	Parti Nationaliste Français et Européen	PNFE	French and European Nationalist Party	France	Neo-nazi	1
13035		FN	National Front	France	Neo-nazi	2
13040	Right-wing extremists (France)			France	Extreme- right	2

					Type of	Number
Code	Name	Acronym	Translation	Country	terrorism	of killings
13045	Neo-Nazi extremists (France)			France	Neo-nazi	5
15001	Rote Armee Fraktion	RAF	Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Group)	Germany	Extreme- left	34
15002	Bewegung 2. Juni		2nd June Movement	Germany	Extreme- left	4
15003	Rote Zellen	RZ	Red Cells	Germany	Extreme- left	1
15010	Neo-Nazi extremists (Germany)			Germany	Neo-nazi	122
16001	Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri	RO-N17	17th November Revolutionary Organization	Greece	Extreme- left	22
16002	Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas	ELA	Revolutionary People's struggle	Greece	Extreme- left	1
16003	Omatha Ionnios 1978		Group June 1978	Greece	Extreme- left	1
16004	Epanastatiki Organosi 1 Maiou		Revolutionary Organization 1 st May	Greece	Extreme- left	1
16010	Elliniko Ethniko Sosialistiko Komma		Greek National Socialist Party	Greece	Extreme- right	1
16011	Chrysi Avgi		Golden Dawn	Greece	Neo-nazi	3
	Neonazi extremists (Greece)			Greece	Neo-nazi	3
18001	Neonazi extremists (Ireland)			Ireland	Neo-nazi	1
19001	Brigate Rosse	BR	Red Brigades	Italy	Extreme- left	53
19002	Grupo XXII Ottobre		The October 22 Group	Italy	Extreme- left	1
19004	Lotta Armata per il Comunismo		Armed proleterians for Communism	Italy	Extreme- left	2
19005	Prima Linea	PL	First Line	Italy	Extreme- left	17
19006	Nuclei Armati Proletari	NAP	Armed Proletarian Groups	Italy	Extreme- left	3
19007	Grupo de Azione Partigiana	GAP	Partisan Action Group	Italy	Extreme- left	1
19008	Brigate Comunisti Combattente	BCC	Fighting Communist Brigade	Italy	Extreme- left	1
19009	Formazione Comunista Combattent	FCC	Figthing Communist Groups	Italy	Extreme- left	4
19010		PAC	Armed Proletarians for Communism	Italy	Extreme- left	5
19011	Guerriglia Comunista	GC	The Communist Guerrillas	Italy	Extreme- left	4
19012	Squadre Proletarie Combattenti	SPDC	Fighting Proletarian Squad	Italy	Extreme- left	1
19013	Comitati Comunisti Rivoluzionari	CCR	Revolutionary Communist Committees	Italy	Extreme- left	2
19014	Guerriglia Proletaria	GP	Proletarian Guerrilla	Italy	Extreme- left	1
19015	Formazioni Comuniste Armate	FCA	Armed Comunist Formations	Italy	Extreme- left	1
19016	Nuclei Comuniste	NCT	Territorial Communist	Italy	Extreme-	1

Code	Name	Acronym	Translation	Country	Type of terrorism	Number of killings
	Territoriali		Groups		left	innings
19017	Colonna Fabrizio Pelli		Fabrizio Pelli Column	Italy	Extreme- left	1
19018	Ronde Armate Proletarie	RAP	Proletarian Armed Squad	Italy	Extreme- left	1
19019	Brigatta XXVIII Marzo		28 March Brigade	Italy	Extreme- left	2
19020	Brigate Rosse- Walter Alasia	BR-WA	Red Brigadas – Walter Alasia	Italy	Extreme- left	3
19021	Brigate Rosse- Partito Guerriglia	BR-PG	Red Brigades – Guerrilla Party	Italy	Extreme- left	13
19022	Barbagia Rossa		Red Barbagia	Italy	Extreme- left	2
19023	Brigata Operaria per il Comunismo	BOC	Worker Brigade for Comunism	Italy	Extreme- left	1
19024	Nucleo di Comunisti	NC	Communist Nucleus	Italy	Extreme- left	2
19025	Comunisti Organizzati per la Liberaziones Proletaria	COLP	Communists for the Proletariat Liberation	Italy	Extreme- left	2
19026	Potere Rosso		Red Power	Italy	Extreme- left	1
19027	Potere Proletario Armato	PPA	Armed Proletarian Power	Italy	Extreme- left	1
19028	Brigate Rosse- Partito Comunista Combattente	BR-PCC	Red Brigadas – Fighting Communist Party	Italy	Extreme- left	9
19029	Unione dei Comunisti Combattenti	UCC	Union of Combattant Communists	Italy	Extreme- left	2
19030	Autonomia (Italy)		Autonomy	Italy	Extreme- left	9
19035	Left-wing extremists (Italy)			Italy	Extreme- left	11
19040	Anarchists (Italy)			Italy	Extreme- left	5
19050	Ordine Nuovo		New Order	Italy	Extreme- right	30
19051	Movimento Sociale Italiano	MSI	Italian Social Movement	Italy	Extreme- right	10
19052	Ordine Nero	ON	Black Order	Italy	Extreme- right	26
19053	Avanguarda Nazionale	AN	National Vanguard	Italy	Extreme- right	10
19054	Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari	NAR	Armed Revolutionary Nuclei	Italy	Extreme- right	117
19055	Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari-terza posizione	NAR-TP	Armed Revolutionary Nuclei -Third Way	Italy	Extreme- right	2
19060	Right-wing extremists (Italy)			Italy	Extreme- right	34
19070	Neo-Nazi extremists (Italy)			Italy	Neo-nazi	2
19080	Befreiungsausschuss Südtirol	BAS	South Tyrolean Liberation Committee	Italy	Nationalist	14
21001	Neonazi Extremists (Netherlands)			Netherlands	Neo-nazi	2

					Type of	Number
Code	Name	Acronym	Translation	Country	terrorism	of
						killings
	Neonazi extremists (Norway)			Norway	Neo-nazi	1
23001	Forças Populares 25 Abril	FP25	Popular Forces of April 25	Portugal	Extreme- left	20
23002	Brigadas Revolucionarias	BR	Revolutionary Brigades	Portugal	Extreme- left	1
23010	Right-wing extremists (Portugal)			Portugal	Extreme- right	9
23015	Neo-Nazi extremists (Portugal)			Portugal	Neo-nazi	4
24001	Euskadi ta Askatusuna -militar	ETAm	Basque Homeland and Freedom, military branch	Spain	Nationalist	772
24002	Euskadi ta Askatusuna -político-militar	ETApm	Basque Homeland and Freedom, political- military branch	Spain	Nationalist	24
24003	Comandos Autónomos Anticapitalistas	CAA	Anticapitalist Autonomous Commandos	Spain	Nationalist	32
	político-militar VIII Asamblea	ETApm- VIII	Basque Homeland and Freedom, political- military branch 8th Assembly	Spain	Nationalist	1
24005	Gatazka		Struggle	Spain	Nationalist	1
24006	Iraultza		Revolution	Spain	Nationalist	1
24007	Basque nationalists (Spain)			Spain	Nationalist	5
24010	Front d'Alliberament Català	FAC	Catalan Liberation Front	Spain	Nationalist	2
24011	Exèrcit Popular Català	EPOCA	Catalan Popular Army	Spain	Nationalist	3
24012	Terra Lliure		Free Land	Spain	Nationalist	1
24013	Movimiento por la Autodeterminación e Indepencia del Archipiélago Canario	MPAIAC	Movement for the Self- Determination and the Independence of the Canarian Archipelago	Spain	Nationalist	1
24014	Frente Revolucionario Antifascista Vasco- Aragonés	FRAVA	Basque-Aragonese Antifascist Revolutionary Front	Spain	Nationalist	1
24015	Exército Guerrilheiro do Povo Galego Ceive	EGPGC	Free Galician Guerrilla People's Army	Spain	Nationalist	2
24020	Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre	GRAPO	Antifascist Resistance Groups First October	Spain	Extreme- left	85
24021	Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota	FRAP	Patriot Antifascist Revolutionary Front	Spain	Extreme- left	4
24022	Movimiento Ibérico de Liberación	MIL	Iberian Liberation Movement	Spain	Extreme- left	1
24023	Colectivo Hoz y Martillo		Collective Group Sickle and Hammer	Spain	Extreme- left	1
24024	Anarchists (Spain)			Spain	Extreme- left	4
24025	Left wing extremists (Spain)			Spain	Extreme- left	2
24030		BVE	Basque-Spanish Battalion	Spain	Extreme- right	24
24031	Alianza Apostólica	Triple A	Anticommunist	Spain	Extreme-	11

Code	Name	Acronym	Translation	Country	Type of terrorism	Number of
	Anticomunista		Apostolic Alliance		right	killings
24032	Grupos Armados Españoles	GAE	Spanish Armed Groups	Spain	Extreme- right	5
24033	1	GAL	Antiterrorist Liberation Groups	Spain	Extreme- right	27
24035	(Spain)			Spain	Extreme- right	23
24040	Neo-Nazi extremists (Spain)			Spain	Neo-nazi	49
25001	Nationalistiska Republikanska Armén	NRA	Nationalist Republican Army	Sweden	Neo-nazi	2
25005	Neo-Nazi extremists (Sweden)			Sweden	Neo-nazi	6
26001	Orden der Arischen Ritter		Order of Aryan Knights	Switzerland	Neo-nazi	1
27001	Provisional Irish republican Army	PIRA		United Kingdom	Nationalist	1,648
27002	The Official Irish Republican Army	OIRA		United Kingdom	Nationalist	49
27003	Irish National Liberation Army	INLA		United Kingdom	Nationalist	130
27004	The Irish People's Liberation Organisation	IPLO		United Kingdom	Nationalist	21
27005		IPLO-BB		United Kingdom	Nationalist	2
27006	Republican Action Force	RAF		United Kingdom	Nationalist	24
27007	Real Irish Republican Army	RIRA		United Kingdom	Nationalist	31
27008	Republicans (NI)	Republican (NI)		United Kingdom	Nationalist	80
27010	The Loyalist Volunteer Force	LVF		United Kingdom	viligante	21
27011	The Ulster Loyalist Force	UVF		United Kingdom	viligante	529
27012	Ulster Freedom Fighters	UFF		United Kingdom	viligante	152
27013	Ulster Defence Association	UDA		United Kingdom	viligante	245
27014	Red Hand Defenders	RHD		United Kingdom	viligante	7
27015	Loyalists (NI)	"Loyalists (NI)"		United Kingdom	viligante	79
27020	Neo-Nazi extremists (UK)			United Kingdom	Neo-nazi	69

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