Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes

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Abstract

When do elections in authoritarian regimes lead to democracy? Building from the distinction between competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes, I argue that the presence of stronger opposition challengers renders competitive authoritarian elections more prone to democratization, but only when domestic and international actors choose to actively pressure the regime. The effects of two forms of pressure—opposition electoral coalitions and international conditionality— are theorized. Propositions are tested using an original dataset of 203 elections in electoral authoritarian regimes, from 1990-2007. Results support two core claims: that the effect of electoral pressure is conditional on the type of authoritarianism; and that this greater vulnerability to pressure is the reason why competitive authoritarian elections are more likely to lead to democracy. In contrast, several alternative explanations—that democratization is explained by alternation in power, better electoral conduct, or ongoing processes of liberalization—are not supported by the evidence.

Since the end of the cold war, dictators around the globe have adapted to the changed international environment by adopting the form—though not necessarily the substance—of democracy. The result has been a proliferation of electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes in which political offices are filled through multiparty elections, but the electoral playing field is skewed in favor of the ruling party (Schedler 2006, 3). These "hybrid" regimes defy straightforward classification and challenge traditional, teleological theories of democratization (Diamond 2002). Their proliferation has therefore created a surge of scholarly interest in explaining when they democratize (Levitsky and Way 2010), when dictators can be defeated at the ballot box (Bunce and Wolchik 2010), as well as whether the repeated holding of elections produces democratization (Lindberg 2006, 2009). However, a central unresolved puzzle about EA regimes is why elections serve to bolster authoritarian rule at some times yet undermine it at others. When do elections lead to democracy?

The first step toward answering this question is to consider the differences in electoral context across EA sub-types. In hegemonic authoritarian regimes (HARs), the incumbent or ruling party enjoys overwhelming electoral dominance (conventionally understood as winning more than 70 or 75% of the vote or seat share). In competitive authoritarian regimes (CARs), opposition parties pose greater electoral challenges and garner a larger share of votes. In a quantitative analysis covering 158 authoritarian regimes, Brownlee (2009) finds that CARs are significantly more likely than HARs to transition to electoral democracy after a regime breakdown. Yet, the underlying reasons for this difference—and the role played by elections—remain unclear. While it is straightforward to understand why stronger opposition challengers in CARs should translate to a higher probability of *alternation in power,* it is not obvious why CARs should be more likely to *democratize*—an outcome which entails a systematic

improvement in the quality of elections. As Levitsky and Way (2010, 24) note, turnover and democratization are distinct phenomena, and many EA regimes remain durably authoritarian even after alternation in power to the opposition. Moreover, the presence of stronger opposition challengers in CARs arguably only increases the incumbent's incentives to manipulate elections—an outcome antithetical to democratization. Howard and Roessler (2006) show that opposition parties in CARs can help overcome these barriers by uniting in a single coalition. To date, however, no study has considered whether opposition strategies exhibit similar effects in less competitive contexts.

This article takes the key difference between CARs and HARs—the degree of incumbent or ruling party dominance—as the starting point for theorizing the conditions under which authoritarian elections lead to democratization. I argue that dominance matters because it conditions the effectiveness of domestic and international pressure for democracy. The fact that the incumbent is in a weaker position in CARs provides opposition parties with greater opportunities to forge *electorally viable coalitions.* Because they are perceived as having a real chance of victory, these coalitions influence the choices of key domestic actors in ways that decrease the incumbent's ability to engage in electoral manipulation. Second, the fact that incumbents are less electorally secure in CARs means that their need for external support is greater; this in turn increases the government's sensitivity to *international pressure for democracy*.

These propositions are tested on a comprehensive dataset of elections in EA regimes, from 1990-2007. Information on opposition coalitions and international pressure is originally coded from news sources and primary documents. The data are also used to evaluate a number of alternative explanations for why competitive authoritarian elections are more likely to lead to

democracy. I find, perhaps surprisingly, that CARs are no more likely than HARs to be on a liberalizing path to democracy, nor do they exhibit better electoral conduct. Moreover, CARs' greater propensity to democratize is not explained by their higher frequency of alternation in power. These facts, which belie conventional wisdom about EA regimes, imply that competitive authoritarian elections are not inherently more likely to lead to democracy. Rather, it is the application of specific forms of domestic or international pressure that can transform these contests into mechanisms for democratization. When applied in HARs, the same forms of pressure are ineffective. These core findings stand even after accounting for the fact that regime type is not randomly assigned across countries.

Democratization in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes

Early research on hybrid regimes identified the key distinction between electoral authoritarianism and democracy as hinging upon the quality of electoral competition (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2006, Ch.1). EA regimes allow multiple parties to compete in elections, but they do so under patently unfair conditions. Incumbents may place barriers on opposition parties' ability to campaign; generate a pro-government media bias; stack electoral commissions and courts with their supporters; or resort to stuffing ballot boxes and manipulating vote tabulations. Among EA regimes, a further distinction can be made based on the degree to which the incumbent or ruling party is electorally dominant (Diamond 2002; Brownlee 2009, 518). In HARs, the ruling party wins elections by overwhelming margins, while in CARs, elections serve as "arenas through which opposition forces may—and frequently do—pose significant challenges," despite many obstacles to their success (Levitsky and Way 2002, 54).

For any EA regime, a transition to democracy entails a meaningful improvement in the quality of elections. In democracies, elections meet a threshold of fairness that authoritarian elections do not: parties compete on a level playing field, the casting and counting of ballots is conducted "in the absence of massive voter fraud," and the election's results "are representative of the public will" (Freedom House 2010). It is important to emphasize that democratization entails a change in the conduct—not only (or necessarily) the outcome—of elections. Many EA regimes experience a change in leadership, even an opposition victory, yet exhibit no subsequent improvement in the quality of electoral competition. In their study of competitive authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way note the frequency of cases in which "the government changed, but the regime did not" (2010, 21). Kyrgyzstan, for example, experienced a dramatic political rupture in the wake of its flawed election in 2005, but the new government quickly returned to the old pattern of manipulating elections and suppressing political competition. Indeed, of the five "successful" post-communist electoral revolutions, only two (Ukraine and Serbia) were followed by democratic change (Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009).

Previous research suggests that one step toward understanding when elections lead to democracy is to account for the political context in which the contests take place. In analyses of authoritarian breakdown (Brownlee 2009) as well as in a country-year panel dataset (Roessler and Howard 2009), CARs are consistently found to be more likely to transition to electoral democracy than HARs. But this is in many ways a puzzling finding. While it is straightforward to understand why electorally weaker incumbents in CARs should be more likely to lose power (Roessler and Howard 2009, 103), we lack an explanation for why CARs should be more likely to democratize—which, to reiterate, entails a systematic improvement in the quality of elections. The mechanisms linking authoritarian regime type, elections, and democratization are, as yet,

under-theorized and untested. As a preliminary conjecture, Brownlee hypothesizes that this difference stems from the "higher levels of contestation enjoyed by opposition parties" in CARs (2009, 521), yet he notes the need for "closer examination of the causal processes that propel these trends" (530). How exactly does the existence of greater electoral contestation in CARs translate to democratization? And how do electoral dynamics differ in HARs?

While existing research provides no unified theory of elections in EA regimes, insights can be gleaned from the growing body of work on competitive authoritarianism, which underscores the importance of international forces and opposition party tactics for democratization. In their sweeping study of competitive authoritarian regimes since the end of the cold war, Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that economic and social linkage with the West (which varies by region) is the primary cause of democratization, and the reason why CARs in Latin America and Central Europe have been more likely to democratize than those in Africa, Asia and the former Soviet Union. Yet, this broad claim about long-term regime trajectories is unable to account for intra-regional variation or for the particular timing of democratic transitions. Focusing more narrowly on a set of 50 elections in CARs, Howard and Roessler (2006) find that "liberalizing electoral outcomes" (which entail movement toward democracy, but not necessarily full democratization) are most likely when opposition parties mobilize and forge coalitions. Bunce and Wolchik (2010) similarly emphasize the importance of opposition strategies in ousting cheating incumbents in post-communist competitive authoritarian regimes.

Research on hegemonic regimes paints a different picture. Theories of dominant party politics inspired by Mexico under the PRI—a paradigmatic HAR—emphasize the electoral consequences of the state's vast resource advantages, which allow the regime to elicit mass support (Magaloni 2006), and encourage the opposition to pursue self-defeating tactics (Greene

2007). Thus, rather than providing opportunities for genuine political competition, elections serve primarily as mechanisms for patronage allocation (Lust-Okar 2009). Under these conditions, democratization is caused not by proximate electoral strategies, but by a change in the distribution of resources—often in response to an economic downturn or a shrinking state presence in the economy—which, over time, reduces the regime's ability to maintain popular support and elite unity.[1] Elections themselves rarely pose a threat, and when they do, they are likely reflecting these deeper structural changes.

In what follows, I build from these insights, taking the core difference between CARs and HARs—the degree of ruling party dominance—as the starting point. Because incumbents in CARs face stronger opponents, elections represent moments of particular vulnerability. Most research to date has focused on how vulnerability increases the chances that the incumbent will lose power, but this study theorizes how vulnerability can translate to improvements in the quality of elections, which is the core element of democratic transitions. The next sections explain how two forms of pressure—opposition coalitions and international conditionality—help produce democratization in CARs, and why this pressure is unlikely to be effective in HARs.

Opposition Coalitions

To orchestrate electoral misconduct, incumbents require the cooperation of a number of actors. Party operatives, election commission members, polling station workers, police, and the media are those most commonly complicit—either actively or passively—in electoral manipulation. The choices of these actors depend crucially on perceptions about who is likely to win the election. When opposition parties are fragmented and weak—as in most EA regimes—

[1] On the importance of elite unity for dominant party regimes, see Brownlee (2007).

there is little doubt about electoral outcomes, and orders from the government to orchestrate or tolerate misconduct are likely to be followed with little hesitation. Domestic actors will simply calculate that their best option is to side with the regime (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Van de Walle 2006). As Hale notes in his analysis of post-Soviet presidential elections: "elites want most of all to wind up on the side of the person who wins" (2005, 140).

When opposition parties unite, however, this can lead to a dramatic transformation in perceptions. For the actors that must choose whether to engage in, or tolerate, misconduct, the decision is no longer so clear cut. If it is widely believed that the incumbent is on his way out, regimes will "face defection from their very own machines….elites controlling mass media and even the very courts that are necessary for consummating electoral fraud can also be among the defectors" (Hale 2005,141). Howard and Roessler (2006, 371) further explain:

> An opposition coalition can….increase the perceived risks and costs of repression and manipulation. The police, army, and bureaucrats may be less inclined to employ illegal practices to benefit the incumbent if they calculate that the opposition is sufficiently organized that it can mount a credible challenge to the ruling party, since the authoritarian incumbent's henchmen could face recriminations for their actions if the opposition wins.

An important point is that opposition coalitions are only likely to have such an effect when they are *electorally viable,* meaning they are perceived as having a real chance of victory. This, in turn, depends on the degree of extant competition in the political system. Because opposition parties in CARs begin from a position of relative strength compared to other, less competitive authoritarian regimes, coalitions in CARs are far more likely to gain enough traction to be perceived as electorally viable. This point is supported by previous findings that opposition coalitions in CARs are associated with incumbent defeat (Bunce and Wolchik 2010) and political liberalization (Howard and Roessler 2006). In contrast, coalitions in HARs are likely to be

composed of weak parties with little organizational base and low levels of popular support. The conditions for an opposition coalition victory are simply not present when the ruling party enjoys electoral dominance.

To illustrate this point, consider the different effects of coalition-building in Serbia and Belarus. During the 1990s, Serbia was an archetypical CAR. Freedom was highly curtailed and elections unfair, but Slobodan Milosevic was never able to consolidate electoral dominance. Although the ruling party's vote share ranged from just 29-53 percent during the 1990s,[2] a bitterly fragmented opposition consistently failed to mount credible electoral challenges.[3] The situation changed dramatically in the run-up to the 2000 presidential election when opposition factions set aside their differences and formed a broad coalition—the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS)—with Vojislav Kostunica as their presidential candidate. The coalition had a profound impact on public perceptions, spurring unprecedented pre-election mobilization, campaign activity, and voter turnout (Bunce and Wolchik 2006). While Milosevic did everything in his power to manipulate the contest in his favor, ultimately, defections among key actors in the state (including the army, interior ministry and police), media, and even his own party prevented him from consummating fraud that would rob Kostunica of victory.[4]

Similar coalition-building efforts by the opposition in Belarus fell flat. Different from Serbia—where opposition forces were always politically relevant despite their disadvantage—president Aleksander Lukashenka in Belarus enjoys near absolute power. Since his ascent in

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[2] These figures increase if we account for other parties allied with the government, but the total pro-government vote share never exceeded 2/3 of the vote.

[3] See Cohen (2002) on the opposition's repeated electoral failures in the 1990s.

[4] See Pavlakovic (2005, 128); Graham (2000); Glenny (2000); and Sandford (2000).

1994, elections have been little more than a farce. Presidential contests in 2001 and 2006 were won by overwhelming margins, and by 2004, there was no opposition presence in the legislature. Under these conditions, the Belarussian opposition's attempt to mimic the Serbian revolution by uniting behind a single presidential candidate in 2001 (and again in 2006) failed to gain any traction (Silitski 2010; Shargorodsky 2001; Boris 2001). Without a tipping point in perceptions about the opposition's chances of victory, the regime's grip over electoral management bodies, the media and security forces remained firm; and the majority of citizens remained too afraid, or simply too passive, to defend their right to vote in free and fair elections.

- ***Hypothesis 1:*** The effect of opposition coalitions on democratization is greater in CA elections than in HA elections.

International Conditionality

Since the end of the cold war, the international community has become increasingly active in democracy promotion. There are many tools in the democracy promotion "toolkit"—including election monitoring, democracy aid and diplomatic pressure—but the most direct and immediate way to exert pressure for free and fair elections is through *conditionality*, understood as the linking of concrete punishments or rewards to improvements in the quality of elections.[5] "Negative" conditionality threatens either material (e.g., economic sanctions) or political (e.g., suspension of IGO membership) costs on the government for electoral misconduct, while "positive" conditionality holds out the promise of rewards if conduct improves. In practice, threats and promises are often intimately related. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, for example, makes grants conditional on democratic performance, and the United States has used this instrument to threaten countries—for example, Armenia in response to its flawed election in

[5] On the use of democratic conditionality in Europe, see Kelley (2004) and Vachudova (2005).

2008—with a withdrawal of funds if electoral performance does not improve (MCC 2008). International conditionality can also have indirect consequences in other areas, since democratic credentials are now an important factor influencing the allocation of foreign aid, international investment and multilateral loans (Hyde and Marinov 2008; Lebovic and Voeten 2009); and it can impose symbolic costs on a regime, particularly if the government bases its claims to legitimacy on international support and electoral credentials. By activating these material and symbolic incentives, conditionality can induce governments to reduce their reliance on electoral misconduct, or to tie their hands by introducing institutional reforms that make misconduct more difficult and risky (Donno 2011). Such reforms can include, for example, measures to increase the independence and professionalism of election management bodies, clean up voter registration lists, or modify electoral codes to provide for better transparency and oversight of the vote count (Lehoucq 2002; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002).

The ability of conditionality to influence outcomes in these ways depends crucially on the degree to which the regime is sensitive to international pressure. Because incumbents in CARs find themselves in a weaker political position, a loss of international support can have more serious consequences, particularly in the short-term. Withdrawal of economic benefits in the months leading up to an election is likely to be particularly costly for CARs, for this is the time when resources are most needed to win, buy (or steal) votes. This helps explain why for many CARs, "being on good terms with Western governments and institutions" is of paramount importance (Levitsky and Way 2002; see also McFaul 2010, 178). The fact that CARs are also,

on average, poorer and more reliant on foreign aid than HARs further fuels their sensitivity to international pressure.[6]

The symbolic consequences of a loss of international approval are no less important, since, compared to other forms of authoritarianism, CARs rely to a greater extent on the illusion of democracy. In the Dominican Republic, for example, president Joaquin Balaguer was keenly sensitive to international criticism in the wake of fraudulent elections in 1994.[7] The race had been extremely close, and Balaguer considered international validation essential to stopping any momentum to overturn the results. International pressure was instrumental in ultimately convincing him to forge a “Pact for Democracy” which provided for early presidential elections and specified key reforms of the judiciary and election administration bodies (Hartlyn 1998, 254-255; Espinal 1998; Associated Press 1994). These institutional changes paved the way for free and fair elections in 1996, which marked a transition to electoral democracy.

Incumbents in HARs are better insulated from international pressure. When the regime has a track record of electoral dominance, public perceptions about its durability and the possibility of democratization are less likely to be swayed by international criticism.[8] Moreover, HARs typically sustain themselves through patronage funded by domestic sources—such as natural resource wealth, or simply a large state presence in the economy (as in Belarus, or Mexico under the PRI)—that is unaffected by international pressure for democracy.

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[6] Author’s data. From 1990-2007, the 2-year running average of ODA as a percent of GDP in CARs is 7.7, and in HARs is 6.6. This difference is significant in a t-test.

[7] Misconduct in this election led the Dominican Republic to be taken off Freedom House’s list of electoral democracies. Levitsky and Way (2010) also classify the country as a CAR until 1996.

[8] See Simpser (2011) on how large margins of victory affect public perceptions.

The symbolic consequences of conditionality are also less severe for HARs. While CARs are likely to claim competitive elections as a source of legitimacy, this avenue is unavailable to hegemonic leaders that preside over blatantly lopsided electoral contests. For this reason, in many HARs—such as Singapore under the PAP, or Tunisia under former president Ben Ali—legitimacy stems from *outcomes* such as solid economic performance and the maintenance of social stability, rather than on perceptions of a democratic *process*. The recent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrate just how quickly a hegemonic regime's grip on power can unravel if its performance declines; yet, notably, in neither of these cases did protests center around elections. As Lust-Okar (2009) explains in her analysis of HARs in the Arab world, when elections serve primarily as instruments to determine access to patronage, citizens do not expect contests to be free and fair or evaluate them on this basis. If there is no illusion of democracy to begin with, international efforts to delegitimize the regime on these grounds are unlikely to be effective. Many hegemonic leaders can simply dismiss international criticism altogether, as did Lukashenka in Belarus when he urged supporters in 2001 to "take the election monitors by the scruff of the neck and send them packing so they can fly off with their heads spinning" (Boris 2001).

- ***Hypothesis 2****:* The effect of international pressure for democracy is greater in CA elections than in HA elections.

In sum, pressure for clean elections occurs across regime types, but it should be more effective in CARs than in HARs. This is so not because incumbents in CARs are democrats that willingly give up electoral misconduct. Rather, the application of pressure in CARs can alter incentives, trigger defections, and prompt institutional reforms that limit the government's ability to manipulate elections.

- ***Hypothesis 3:*** Elections in CARs are more likely to lead to democracy than elections in HARs because CARs are more vulnerable to domestic and international pressure.

Alternative Explanations

My core hypothesis, that CARs are more vulnerable to domestic and international electoral pressure than HARs, is not the only possible explanation for why competitive authoritarian elections are more likely to lead to democracy. Elections in CARs and HARs may differ in other ways that are causally relevant for democratization. First, as previous research has noted, CARs are more likely than HARs or closed regimes to experience alternation in power, understood here as a transfer of executive power to the opposition (Roessler and Howard 2009). Because alternation in power follows (rather than precedes) any improvement in electoral conduct, it cannot exert a causal effect on democratization in the current election; but alternation may increase the chances of democratization in the next election if the new government exhibits greater respect for the norms of free and fair competition. This implies a testable hypothesis:

- ***Hypothesis 4:*** Elections in CARs are more likely to lead to democracy because they are more likely to produce alternation in power.

A second set of alternative explanations stems from the idea that CARs may be closer to democracy to begin with. Elections in CARs, though still flawed, may be marked by relatively better conduct than HARs. If so, the changes required to cross the threshold to democratic elections would be smaller and, possibly, easier to achieve. Additionally, CARs may exhibit an already higher level of political openness, or they may be on a liberalizing path to democracy. While competitive authoritarianism is a stable equilibrium for many countries (Levitsky and Way 2010), for others, it may represent a transitional point on the road from closed or hegemonic authoritarianism to democracy. It is therefore important to consider the country's political

trajectory, in particular, whether elections represent the culmination of an ongoing process of liberalization.

- ***Hypothesis 5:*** Elections in CARs are more likely to lead to democracy because they are marked by relatively better electoral conduct.

- ***Hypothesis 6:*** Elections in CARs are more likely to lead to democracy because they occur in a context of greater respect for civil liberties.

- ***Hypothesis 7:*** Elections in CARs are more likely to lead to democracy because they are more likely to occur during periods of political liberalization.

The next section will test these hypotheses in a multivariate analysis. Yet, an initial look at the data provides only mixed support for these arguments, calling into question some conventional assumptions about differences across hybrid regimes. Alternation in power is indeed more likely in CARs: 21% of executive elections in CARs led to alternation, compared to 11% in HARs.[9] And alternation is associated with a higher chance of democratization in the next election (22% versus 13% in contests not following alternation), but this difference is not statistically significant.[10] Elections in CARs are more likely to occur in a more open context, with an average Freedom House civil liberties score in the two years prior to an election of 3.45 in CARs, compared to 2.96 in HARs.[11] However, elections in CARs are not more likely to occur during periods of political liberalization: the average change in Freedom House's political rights

[9] Author's data. The sources and coding of the data are explained in the next section.

[10] A Chi^2 test yields a p-value of *.45;* the null hypothesis of independence cannot be rejected.

[11] A difference of means test was significant at $p=.00$. Scores are inverted so that higher values represent greater freedom.

index in the four years leading up to an election is negative in both regime types (-0.17 in HARs and -0.07 in CARs), and this difference is not statistically significant.

Turning to the quality of elections, Figure 1 reveals, strikingly, that elections in CARs are actually marked by more widespread misconduct—in terms of the scope and range of tools employed—than elections in HARs. The graph shows the percent of elections in each regime type marked by different levels of misconduct intensity. The intensity score gives one point for each of three categories of misconduct: pre-election repression of opposition parties or voters; pre-election bias in the media or institutions that manage elections; and ballot fraud.[12] The fact that CARs are substantially more likely than HARs to exhibit misconduct in multiple areas lends support to the idea that CARs rely to a greater extent on outright electoral manipulation, while HARs are typically able to maintain their dominance without resorting to these tactics (Lust-Okar 2009; Magaloni 2006). Elections in HARs are, however, more likely to exhibit problems in their legal framework.[13] Such problems include, for example, questionable legal barriers on who can run for office, the existence of a high threshold for party registration, and flaws in procedures for lodging complaints about the election (Kelley 2009, 2010). In sum, elections in CARs are, by definition, more competitive in terms of their *outcome*, and tend to be governed by relatively better legal frameworks, but they are not more free and fair in terms of their *conduct*.

[Figure 1]

[12] This measure is explained in detail in the next section.

[13] In Kelley's (2010) quality of elections (QED) data, 63% of elections in HARs are marked by moderate or major problems in their structural/legal environment, compared to 38% in CARs.

Data

To uncover the factors associated with democratization through elections, I constructed a dataset of elections in EA regimes, from 1990-2007. The units of analysis are national elections, both presidential and legislative. Creation of the dataset proceeded in several steps. First, Brownlee's (2009) data and classification rules (which expand Geddes' (1999) dataset on authoritarian regimes) were used to identify EA regimes. Following convention, CARs are distinguished from HARs based on election results: if the ruling party or candidate won less than 75% of the vote in the last election, the regime is classified as a CAR; otherwise, it is classified as a HAR.[14] I then employed Hyde and Marinov's (2009) dataset on *National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy* (NELDA) to identify the set of elections held in these regimes. This yields a sample of 203 elections (130 in CARs and 73 in HARs). Classification as a CAR or a HAR reflects the country's regime type in the year prior to the election. A list of included elections and their regime-type is in the supplemental appendix.

The dependent variable of the analysis is a *transition to electoral democracy*. Following Brownlee (2009), this is a variable indicating whether a country moved from a "0" to a "1" on Freedom House's list of electoral democracies in the year of the election in question. Freedom House (2010) classifies a country as an electoral democracy if it meets four criteria:

1. A competitive, multiparty political system

[14] Using the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (DPI) indexes of executive and legislative electoral competitiveness, a country is coded as CAR if it received a 7 on either index, and as HAR if its highest score on either of the measures was a 5 or a 6. Brownlee's data end in 2004; coding of regime type for 2005-2007 was filled in by the author using DPI.

2. Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offenses)
3. Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and that yield results that are representative of the public will
4. Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning.

Criteria 3 and 4 represent the key differences between electoral authoritarianism and electoral democracy. A transition to democracy therefore entails a fundamental improvement in electoral conduct such that ballots are secure, election results represent the will of the people, and parties compete on a level playing field. Of the 203 elections in the data, 28 marked a transition to electoral democracy; 22 of these occurred in CARs and 6 in HARs.[15]

The first key independent variable is an indicator for *opposition coalition*. Following Howard and Roessler (2006), this measure is coded as "1" if all major opposition parties forged a unified platform, coordinated their campaigns or united behind a single presidential candidate.[16] The second key independent variable, which captures the application of international pressure, is an indicator for pre-election *conditionality,* defined as the issuance of threats or promises that

[15] See Supplementary Appendix B for a list of cases. In all EA regimes, there were only 4 cases in which a democratic transition occurred in a non-election year. Three (Haiti 1994, Panama 1990, Sierra Leone 1998) represent cases in which an elected leader was restored to power following a period of military rule; one (Moldova 1995) occurred in the year after an election.

[16] Howard and Roessler's data was used when available. See Supplemental Appendix C for information on how the remaining elections were coded.

link punishments or rewards to the country's electoral conduct (author's data).[17] Punishments and rewards can be economic (e.g., sanctions, aid, trade agreements) or political (e.g., suspension of diplomatic ties, suspension or granting of membership in an international organization). The variable is coded as "1" if one or more of the following actors employed conditionality during the four months prior to the election: the United States, United Nations, European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe, Organization of American States (OAS), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union.[18] This variable represents the first systematic collection of information on international pressure for free and fair elections around the world.[19]

Next, I constructed variables to test for the alternative explanations, in particular, whether the greater propensity for democratization in CARs is explained by differences in (1) the frequency of alternation in power, (2) electoral conduct, (3) respect for civil liberties, or (4) the

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[17] Conditionality is only coded as occurring if it is clearly targeted toward the country and election in question; regional or ongoing conditionality policies not related to that election are not coded.

[18] These actors were identified through research of a larger set of intergovernmental organizations.

[19] The primary sources of information on international conditionality were stories in international newspapers and newswires. To ensure reliability, all elections were coded twice by different individuals working independently. Inter-coder disagreement was found in less than 10 percent of observations and was resolved by the author. See Supplemental Appendix C for more information on how this variable was constructed.

presence of a prior liberalizing trend. First, a dummy variable captures whether *alternation in executive power* occurred in the previous election. In presidential systems, alternation is coded if the pro-government candidate (including, if applicable, the incumbent himself) lost a presidential election; in parliamentary systems, alternation is coded if the ruling party lost a legislative election. This variable is taken from the NELDA dataset (question 24) (Hyde and Marinov 2009).[20]

Second, I construct a measure for the *intensity of electoral misconduct.* Ranging from 1 to 3, this variable sums the number of areas in which misconduct is present. For each election, one point is given for pre-election restrictions on the opposition's freedom of movement, association or expression; one point for pre-election bias in the media or institutions that govern elections; and one point for ballot fraud. These forms of misconduct are identified using a variety of sources, including the NELDA dataset, more than 400 election observation reports, and news articles.[21]

I control for *regime openness* using the country's Freedom House civil liberties score (measured as the running average in the two years prior to the election).[22] As Howard and Roessler (2006) argue, the existence of a more open political system signifies that the incumbent has accepted—or is constrained by—democratic norms to some extent. Such leaders may also hold cleaner elections. Finally, to control for the possibility that democratization in an election year may simply represent the culmination of an ongoing process of liberalization, I include a

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[20] Missing data points were filled in using Goemens, Gleditsch, and Chiozza's (2009) coding on the occurrence of "regular" alternation in power through elections.

[21] See Supplemental Appendix C for a more detailed description of this variable.

[22] All Freedom House scores are inverted so that higher values represent greater freedom.

variable for *prior liberalization,* measured as the difference in the Freedom House political rights score during the four year period preceding the election.

Analysis

To recap, my argument about regime vulnerability implies, first, that opposition coalitions and international conditionality should be more effective at producing democratization through elections in CARs than in HARs. In the multivariate analyses that follow, interaction terms between competitive authoritarianism and these two forms of pressure are expected to be positive and statistically significant. Second, I have also argued that this greater vulnerability to pressure is the reason why CARs are more likely to democratize than HARs. Thus, any significant difference in the probability of democratization across regime types should disappear once the conditional effects of opposition coalitions and international conditionality are modeled. To put these predictions to the test, I estimate probit models with democratic transition as the dependent variable. All models are run with robust clustered standard errors to adjust for dependence across observations within countries.[23]

Seven control variables are included to capture country- and election-specific factors that may influence the probability of a democratic transition. First, it is likely that democratization occurs primarily in elections that determine who will hold executive power. Because the stakes are higher in these contests, they are more likely to elicit higher levels of domestic mobilization for democracy; executive elections are also more likely to represent the litmus test for

[23] Because the data form an unbalanced panel, PCSEs are infeasible. In a likelihood ratio test, country random effects were not significantly different from zero, indicating that a pooled model is preferred. Fixed effects lead to too many observations dropping from the analysis.

democratization. Therefore, I include a dichotomous variable, *main election*, coded as a “1” for presidential elections in presidential (or mixed) systems and legislative elections in parliamentary systems. Second, I include a variable indicating whether the *incumbent was running* in the election, which should be expected to decrease the chances of democratization.[24] It is also important to account for the country’s electoral history. Lindberg (2006; 2009, Ch. 1) argues that holding elections leads to improvements in institutions and respect for civil liberties that increase opportunities for democratization, and that these changes cumulate as the number of elections increases. I therefore include a variable that counts the *number of previous elections* held under authoritarianism.[25]

Two variables control for economic conditions: first a variable for *GDP per capita*.[26] High income is reliably associated with democracy, though its effect on democratic transitions is less clear cut. Przeworski et al. (2000, Ch. 2), for example, find evidence of a non-monotonic relationship whereby dictatorships at high (but not the highest) levels of income are more likely to democratize. Second, I include a variable for *GDP growth*, measured as the percent change in a country’s GDP from year *t-2* to *t-1*. If it is true that good economic performance bolsters authoritarian regimes, the coefficient on this variable should be negative.

Finally, Levitsky and Way (2010) demonstrate that a country’s neighborhood matters. In regions of the world with high economic and social linkage with the West—namely, Latin

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[24] Data comes from the NELDA dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2009), which defines the incumbent leader according to the individual identified in *Archigos* (Goemans et al. 2009).

[25] Specifically, this is the count of elections held under a continuous authoritarian spell.

[26] Data on GDP and GDP growth is taken from the World Bank (2010).

America and Central/Eastern Europe—authoritarian regimes are more likely to democratize. Accordingly, I include dummy variables for both these regions in the models.

Findings

The first column of Table 1 presents a baseline model that sheds first light on the conditions under which elections in authoritarian regimes lead to democracy. The results reveal that democratization is, as expected, more likely in main elections that determine who holds executive power, and in the two regions of the world marked by high linkage with the West. The results also suggest that strong economic performance bolsters authoritarian regimes, since high income and economic growth are negatively (though marginally) associated with democratization. However, the idea that the repeated holding of elections helps produce democracy is not supported; if anything, democratization becomes marginally less likely as the number of elections held under authoritarianism increases.[27]

[Table 1]

In line with previous research, model 1 shows that democratization is more likely in competitive authoritarian elections than in hegemonic elections. Even after controlling for a host of country- and election-specific factors, there is something different about elections in CARs—some attribute associated with democratization—that remains unexplained. Models 2-5 resolve this puzzle. The variables for opposition coalition and international conditionality are positively signed (model 2), but are only statistically significant when interacted with the indicator for

[27] Lindberg (2006) shows that the repeated holding of elections is associated with improvements in democratic quality in Africa, but this relationship does not appear to hold in other regions, including Latin America (McCoy and Hartlyn 2009) and the Middle East (Lust-Okar 2009).

competitive authoritarianism (model 3). Thus, in support of hypotheses 1 and 2, opposition coalitions and international conditionality greatly increase the likelihood of democratization, but only in CARs, where governments are more vulnerable to electoral pressure. This resonates with Wright's (2009) finding that foreign aid conditionality is more effective in regimes with larger winning coalitions (measured in part by the competitiveness of executive selection). In HARs, these forms of pressure have no discernible effect on democratization. Notably, once the interaction terms are included in the models, the constituent term for CARs loses statistical significance, moving from a p-value of 0.10 to 0.94. This lends support to the claim that vulnerability to pressure is the reason why elections in CARs are more likely to lead to democracy (hypothesis 3). Absent an opposition coalition or international conditionality, democratization in a CA election is no more likely than democratization in an HA election.

To illustrate these findings, Figure 3 depicts the marginal effects of coalitions and conditionality in the two regime types, and Table 2 presents the predicted probability of democratization through elections in CARs and HARs.[28] Table 2 shows that in an average hegemonic authoritarian election with no opposition coalition and no international conditionality, the probability of democratization is just 0.13. Strikingly, this probability is essentially equivalent—at 0.12—in an identical competitive authoritarian election. The fates of CARs and HARs diverge, however, with the application of domestic and international pressure. When opposition parties coalesce or when international actors impose pre-election conditionality in

[28] Figure 3 and Table 2 are based on simulations performed using *Clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001). Unless otherwise specified, all variables are held at their modal values (for dummy variables) or median values (for continuous and ordinal variables).

CARs, the chances of democratization increase to nearly 40 percent; and in elections with both coalitions and conditionality, the probability of democratization climbs to 0.67.

[Table 2 and Figure 3]

In contrast, coalitions and conditionality are associated with a slight decline in the probability of democratization in HARs (though, as Figure 3 shows, this effect is not statistically different from zero). In fact, there is just one example in the data of a HAR in which an opposition coalition and international conditionality is associated with transition to electoral democracy: Haiti 2006, a case marked by unusually high poverty, aid dependence, and vulnerability to U.S. pressure. Otherwise, incumbents in hegemonic regimes appear to be well-insulated from electoral pressure, and may even respond to pressure by tightening their grip on power. In Russia, for example, Putin has worked to pre-empt an electoral revolution by centralizing power, curtailing civil liberties, and crippling opposition parties (Stoner-Weiss 2010).

In sum, the statistical findings lend strong support to the argument that CARs are more vulnerable to electoral pressure than HARs, and that this is the reason that CA elections are more likely to lead to democracy. These core findings are robust to alternative coding schemes for regime type and democratization,[29] and to the inclusion of variables for different electoral

[29] Roessler and Howard (2009) measure democratization as occurring if a country moves to a Freedom House score of 2 or better or a Polity score of 6 or higher. When this alternative measure is employed, results remain substantively unchanged (see Supplementary Appendix D). Results are also largely robust to a re-coding of CARs based on a 70% (rather than 75%) threshold in executive elections only (following Roessler and Howard 2009). The only substantive difference that emerges is a weakening in the significance of opposition coalitions in

systems. Models 4 and 5 (Table 1) further probe the robustness of these results by testing the potential alternative explanations for democratization (hypotheses 4-7). Clearly, their explanatory power is weak. Of the four added variables, only the measure of electoral misconduct intensity is statistically significant, exhibiting a negative effect on democratization. The remaining variables are insignificant.[30] All else equal, then, elections in EA regimes pose little risk of democratization even if power is transferred to the opposition, if the regime exhibits relatively high respect for civil liberties, or if it undergoes partial liberalization. While the effect of opposition coalitions in CARs weakens slightly once these four alternative factors are accounted for, the effect of international conditionality remains strong. Moreover, the coefficient on CARs is only slightly less significant in model 5 compared to the baseline model 1 (p=0.12 compared to p=0.08), suggesting that the four alternative explanations account for a very small amount of the variance across CARs and HARs. Evidently, the difference in democratization between CARs and HARs is not explained by a greater propensity for alternation in power; nor by any prior liberalizing trend, or any difference in the conduct of elections across the two regime types.

Is Regime Type Endogenous?

This article has shown that the type of authoritarianism—hegemonic or competitive—conditions the effects of domestic and international electoral pressure. I have argued that this is a

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CARs, which suggests that coalitions may be particularly effective in countries where executive elections are won by large margins but the opposition gains a greater foothold in the legislature.

[30] Howard and Roessler (2006) similarly find that regime openness and prior liberalization are not significant predictors of liberalizing electoral outcomes in CARs.

causal effect: because incumbents are less electorally dominant in CARs, this increases the ability of opposition parties for forge electorally viable coalitions, and increases the regime's reliance on international approval and support. However, a threat to inference stems from the possibility of endogeneity. Competitive authoritarianism could be a symptom of deeper underlying attributes associated with vulnerability to domestic and international pressure. If so, it would not be competitive authoritarianism itself that conditions the effects of pressure; rather countries more vulnerable to pressure (and democratization) would be those likely to emerge as competitive authoritarian. To evaluate this possibility, I employ a Heckman probit model to account for any unobserved factors that are simultaneously driving both selection into competitive authoritarianism and democratization.[31] The dependent variable for the selection equation is the indicator for competitive authoritarian regimes. The main equation then predicts the probability of democratization in CARs (the uncensored sample). The coefficient ρ represents the correlation in the error terms of the selection equation and the outcome equation. Only a positive, significant ρ would be problematic for this study, because it would indicate that selection into competitive authoritarianism is associated with a higher underlying propensity for democratization.

Table 3 presents the results. Due to the small number of observations in the sample, I limit the number of covariates in the model to the independent variables of interest, plus the baseline control variables. The selection equation (column *a*) includes economic and regional controls, as well as one additional variable that influences whether a country is a HAR or CAR:

[31] The "heckprob" routine in Stata 11 was used to estimate a bivariate probit model with sample selection. For other applications of this model, see Mitchell and Hensel (2007); Pevehouse and Russett (2006); and Reed (2000).

Finkel, Pérez-Linan, and Seligson's (2007) measure of U.S. military assistance priority.[32] This variable—defined as the percentage of U.S. military and counternarcotics grants allocated to a country in a particular year—captures the existence of a source of funding that authoritarian leaders can use to consolidate hegemonic rule; yet, importantly, it is allocated for reasons unrelated to the country's regime type.[33] As expected, the variable is negatively associated with competitive authoritarianism.

[Table 3]

The results can increase our confidence that electoral pressure does exert a causal effect on democratization in CARs, and that this finding is not driven by selection bias. The measure of U.S. military assistance priority performs well. Most importantly, the correlation between the error terms of the selection equation and the equation for democratization in CARs is positive ($\rho = 0.45$) yet not statistically significant ($p = 0.40$). Thus, the null hypothesis of independent equations cannot be rejected, and a standard probit model is the preferred method. However, it is worth noting that results in the main equation of the Heckman model are in line with previous findings: both opposition coalitions and international conditionality are significantly associated with democratization in CARs.

Conclusion

Since the end of the cold war, democratization through elections has become an increasingly prominent mode of regime change (Lindberg 2009). Of the 32 transitions to

[32] Missing values for 2004-2007 were multiply imputed using *Amelia II* (King et al. 2010).

[33] To confirm that the exclusion restriction is valid, I ran the Table 1 models (predicting democratization) with the military assistance measure included as a covariate (Supplementary Appendix E). The measure is never significant, a finding echoed by Finkel et al (2007).

electoral democracy recorded by Freedom House from 1990-2007, only 3 were not ushered in through elections. Yet, puzzlingly, the study of democratization in hybrid regimes has remained largely disconnected from the study of elections. This article has helped bridge this divide by exploring the conditions under which elections in authoritarian regimes lead to democracy. In the process, it has challenged some commonly-held ideas about EA regimes.

Contra those who tout the intrinsic tensions and fragility of competitive authoritarianism, the findings here suggest that there is nothing inherently unstable about this type of hybrid regime. Instead, CARs are more accurately characterized as *potentially* unstable, in the sense that democratization is contingent on whether domestic and international actors choose to pressure the regime. Absent pressure, elections in CARs are no more likely to lead to democracy than elections in hegemonic regimes. Nor are elections in CARs manifestly closer to democracy to begin with, at least in terms of their conduct. While HA elections tend to be held under an inferior legal framework, active electoral misconduct is more widespread in CARs, likely because leaders in these regimes have a greater need for misconduct to ensure victory. As the scope of misconduct increases, the prospect that an election will usher in democracy declines. Yet, in CARs, the government's ability to manipulate can be offset if opposition parties forge a unified front and international actors threaten to punish the regime for violations of electoral norms.

This study also challenges analysts to think carefully about the relationship between democratization—which is related to the electoral *process*—and alternation in power—which relates to electoral *outcomes*. While these two phenomena often coincide—for example, the democratizing elections in the Dominican Republic (1996), Peru (2001), and Kenya (2002)—they should not be conflated. Indeed, the finding that alternation is not a significant predictor of

democratization in the next election suggests that alternation may best be understood as a symptom, rather than a direct cause, of democracy. This point has implications for domestic and international groups interested in democracy promotion, for it suggests that a focus on ousting dictators should be accompanied in equal measure by attention to the democratic process, for example, through encouraging institutional reforms that improve electoral governance and rule of law. The electoral revolution in Kyrgyzstan is a stark example of leadership turnover unaccompanied by any real improvement in democratic performance, but the revolutions in Georgia (2004) and Ukraine (2005) exhibit a similar dynamic. Six years on, both countries continue to struggle with electoral irregularities; corruption; and, in Georgia, a troubling decline in media freedom. In contrast, alternation in power in Slovakia (1998) was accompanied by rapid institutional reform, facilitated by conditionality and assistance from the European Union. Variation across these post-communist cases may prove instructive for the 2011 revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, where euphoria over the dictators' departure must now give way to more practical consideration of the challenges associated with introducing free and fair elections and, in the longer term, achieving wholesale political transformation. Elections are surely an essential element of these countries' impending political transitions, but the findings presented here underscore the importance of the political context in which these contests are held. In such longstanding hegemonic regimes, where citizens have lived through decades of lopsided electoral charades, the creation of a competitive political system with coherent opposition parties will likely be an important step toward altering public perceptions about the purpose, authenticity and legitimacy of elections.

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Figure 1. Intensity of Electoral Misconduct, by Authoritarian Type



Figure 2. Effect of Domestic and International Pressure on the Probability of Democratization

A. Hegemonic Authoritarian Elections



B. Competitive Authoritarian Elections



Table 1. The Determinants of Democratization through Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	0.46+	0.48+	0.03	0.07	0.43
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.94)	(0.82)	(0.12)
Opposition Coalition		0.51+	-0.18	0.19	
		(0.08)	(0.65)	(0.64)	
International Conditionality		0.40	-0.55	-0.34	
		(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.48)	
CAR x Opp. Coalition			0.99+	0.75	
			(0.07)	(0.18)	
CAR x Conditionality			1.42*	1.28*	
			(0.03)	(0.04)	
Main Election	0.83**	0.82*	0.89**	0.83*	0.78*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Incumbent Running	-0.28	-0.21	-0.27	-0.11	-0.19
	(0.37)	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.73)	(0.52)
# Previous Elections	-0.11	-0.17+	-0.19+	-0.16	-0.08
	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.38)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.20+	-0.19	-0.24+	-0.26*	-0.24*
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.15)
Central and Eastern Europe	1.11**	0.97*	0.80+	0.87+	1.25**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.01)
Americas	1.13**	1.15**	1.51**	1.49**	1.15**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Alternation, Previous Elec.				0.15	0.09
				(0.82)	(0.87)
Misconduct Intensity				-0.28*	-0.19
				(0.04)	(0.12)
Regime Openness				0.16	0.06
				(0.31)	(0.62)
Prior Liberalization				0.08	0.18
				(0.58)	(0.20)
Constant	-0.52	-0.71	-0.16	-0.47	-0.71
	(0.54)	(0.45)	(0.87)	(0.68)	(0.47)
Pseudo R^2	.22	.25	.28	.32	.25
Log pseudo-likelihood	-63.16	-61.01	-58.48	-55.72	-60.82
Observations	203	203	203	203	203

Robust p values in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 2. Predicted Probability of Democratization

	Probability of Democratic Transition
Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes:	
No Coalition, No Conditionality	.13
	[.03, .30]
Coalition	.10
	[.01, .31]
Conditionality	.05
	[.01, .15]
Coalition + Conditionality	.04
	[.00, .17]
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes:	
No Coalition, No Conditionality	.12
	[.04, .26]
Coalition	.36
	[.14, .61]
Conditionality	.38
	[.11, .70]
Coalition + Conditionality	.67
	[.33, .91]

95 % confidence intervals in brackets
Other variables held at modal (for dummy variables) or median values

Table 3. Heckman Selection Model of Democratization in CARs

	(a) CAR	(b) Dem. Transition
Opposition Coalition		0.77*
		(0.02)
International Conditionality		0.73*
		(0.04)
Main Election		0.77*
		(0.03)
Incumbent Running		-0.44
		(0.27)
# Previous Elections		-0.18+
		(0.09)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.26*	-0.10
	(0.05)	(0.48)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	0.02	-0.04
	(0.35)	(0.13)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.10	0.25
	(0.86)	(0.73)
Americas	0.60	1.08**
	(0.31)	(0.01)
U.S. Military Assistance Priority	-0.14**	
	(0.00)	
Constant	2.13*	-0.96
	(0.01)	(0.37)
ρ		.45
		(.40)
Chi2	23.66**	
	(.01)	
Log pseudo-likelihood	-162.48	
Observations	203	
Observations (uncensored)	130	

Robust p values in parentheses. Two-tailed tests:
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Supplementary Appendix A. Elections in HARs and CARs, 1990-2007[34]

Country	Year	Elec. Type	Regime Type
Algeria	1991	Leg.	HAR
Algeria	1997	Leg.	CAR
Algeria	1999	Pres.	CAR
Algeria	2002	Leg.	CAR
Algeria	2004	Pres.	CAR
Algeria	2007	Leg.	CAR
Armenia	1995	Leg.	CAR
Armenia	1996	Pres.	CAR
Armenia	1998	Pres.	CAR
Armenia	1999	Leg.	CAR
Armenia	2007	Leg.	CAR
Azerbaijan	1995	Leg.	HAR
Azerbaijan	1998	Pres.	CAR
Azerbaijan	2000	Leg.	CAR
Azerbaijan	2003	Pres.	CAR
Azerbaijan	2005	Leg.	CAR
Bangladesh	1991	Leg.	CAR
Belarus	1994	Pres.	HAR
Belarus	1995	Leg.	HAR
Belarus	2000	Leg.	HAR
Belarus	2001	Pres.	HAR
Belarus	2004	Leg.	HAR
Belarus	2006	Pres.	CAR
Botswana	1994	Leg.	HAR
Bosnia	1996	Pres.+Leg.	HAR
Bosnia	2006	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Botswana	1999	Leg.	CAR
Botswana	2004	Leg.	CAR
Burkina Faso	1997	Leg.	HAR
Burkina Faso	1998	Pres.	HAR
Burkina Faso	2002	Leg.	HAR
Burkina Faso	2005	Pres.	CAR
Burkina Faso	2007	Leg.	CAR
Burundi	2005	Leg.	HAR
Cambodia	1998	Leg.	HAR
Cambodia	2003	Leg.	HAR
Cameroon	1992	Pres.	HAR
Cameroon	1997	Pres.	CAR
Cameroon	2002	Leg.	CAR
Cameroon	2004	Pres.	HAR
Cameroon	2007	Leg.	HAR
Chad	2001	Pres.	CAR
Chad	2002	Leg.	CAR
Chad	2006	Pres.	CAR
Congo (Brazzaville)	1993	Leg.	HAR
Congo (Brazzaville)	2007	Leg.	CAR
Cote d'Ivoire	1995	Pres.	HAR
Cote d'Ivoire	2000	Pres.	HAR
Djibouti	1997	Leg.	CAR
Djibouti	1999	Pres.	CAR
Djibouti	2003	Leg.	CAR
Djibouti	2005	Pres.	CAR
Dominican Republic	1996	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Egypt	1990	Leg.	HAR
Egypt	1993	Pres.	HAR
Egypt	1995	Leg.	HAR
Egypt	1999	Pres.	HAR
Egypt	2000	Leg.	HAR
Egypt	2005	Pres.	HAR
Ethiopia	2000	Leg.	HAR
Ethiopia	2005	Leg.	CAR
Gabon	1993	Pres.	CAR
Gabon	1996	Leg.	CAR
Gabon	1998	Pres.	CAR
Gabon	2001	Leg.	CAR
Gabon	2005	Pres.	CAR
Gabon	2006	Leg.	CAR
Georgia	1999	Leg.	CAR
Georgia	2000	Pres.	CAR
Georgia	2003	Leg.	CAR
Georgia	2004	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Ghana	1996	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Ghana	2000	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Guinea	1995	Leg.	CAR
Guinea	1998	Pres.	CAR
Guinea	2002	Leg.	CAR
Guinea	2003	Pres.	CAR
Guinea-Bissau	1999	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Guinea-Bissau	2004	Leg.	CAR
Guyana	1992	Pres.+Leg.	HAR
Haiti	1995	Pres.	CAR
Haiti	2000	Pres.	HAR
Haiti	2006	Pres.+Leg.	HAR
Indonesia	1992	Leg.	CAR
Indonesia	1997	Leg.	CAR
Indonesia	1999	Leg.	CAR
Iran	1992	Leg.	HAR
Iran	1993	Pres.	HAR
Iran	1996	Leg.	HAR
Iran	1997	Pres.	HAR
Iran	1998	Leg.	HAR
Iran	2000	Leg.	HAR
Iran	2001	Pres.	HAR
Iran	2004	Leg.	HAR
Iran	2005	Pres.	HAR
Jordan	1997	Leg.	HAR
Jordan	2003	Leg.	HAR
Jordan	2007	Leg.	HAR
Kazakhstan	1995	Leg.	HAR
Kazakhstan	1999	Pres.	CAR
Kazakhstan	2004	Leg.	CAR
Kazakhstan	2005	Pres.	CAR
Kazakhstan	2007	Leg.	CAR
Kenya	1994	Leg.	CAR
Kenya	1997	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Kenya	2002	Pres.+Leg.	CAR

[34] If multiple elections occurred in the same year, this list records only the main (executive) election.

Country	Year	Elec. Type	Regime Type
Kuwait	1996	Leg.	HAR
Kuwait	1999	Leg.	HAR
Kuwait	2003	Leg.	HAR
Kuwait	2006	Leg.	HAR
Kyrgyzstan	1995	Pres.	HAR
Kyrgyzstan	2000	Pres.	CAR
Kyrgyzstan	2005	Pres.	CAR
Kyrgyzstan	2007	Leg.	CAR
Lebanon	1996	Leg.	HAR
Lebanon	2000	Leg.	CAR
Lebanon	2005	Leg.	CAR
Lesotho	2002	Leg.	HAR
Madagascar	1992	Pres.	CAR
Madagascar	1993	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Malaysia	1990	Leg.	CAR
Malaysia	1995	Leg.	CAR
Malaysia	1999	Leg.	CAR
Malaysia	2004	Leg.	CAR
Mauritania	1996	Leg.	CAR
Mauritania	1997	Pres.	CAR
Mauritania	2001	Leg.	HAR
Mauritania	2003	Pres.	HAR
Mauritania	2006	Leg.	CAR
Mexico	1991	Leg.	CAR
Mexico	1994	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Mexico	1997	Leg.	CAR
Mexico	2000	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Moldova	1994	Leg.	HAR
Morocco	1993	Leg.	HAR
Morocco	1997	Leg.	HAR
Morocco	2002	Leg.	HAR
Morocco	2007	Leg.	CAR
Mozambique	1999	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Mozambique	2004	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Nicaragua	1990	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Niger	1999	Pres.	CAR
Nigeria	2007	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Paraguay	1991	Leg.	CAR
Paraguay	1993	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Peru	1995	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Peru	2000	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Peru	2001	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Romania	1992	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Russia	1993	Leg.	CAR
Russia	2004	Pres.	CAR
Russia	2007	Leg.	CAR
Senegal	1993	Pres.	CAR
Senegal	1998	Leg.	CAR
Senegal	2000	Pres.	CAR
Senegal	2001	Leg.	CAR
Serbia	1997	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Serbia	2000	Pres.	CAR
Singapore	1991	Leg.	HAR
Singapore	1993	Pres.	HAR
Singapore	1997	Leg.	HAR
Singapore	2001	Leg.	HAR
Singapore	2006	Leg.	HAR
South Africa	1994	Leg.	CAR
Sudan	2000	Pres.+Leg.	HAR
Tajikistan	1999	Pres.	CAR
Tajikistan	2000	Leg.	CAR
Tajikistan	2005	Leg.	CAR
Tajikistan	2006	Pres.	CAR
Tanzania	1995	Pres.+Leg.	HAR
Tanzania	2000	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Tanzania	2005	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Thailand	1992	Leg.	CAR
Thailand	2007	Leg.	HAR
Togo	1994	Leg.	HAR
Togo	1998	Pres.	CAR
Togo	1999	Leg.	CAR
Togo	2002	Leg.	CAR
Togo	2003	Pres.	CAR
Togo	2005	Pres.	CAR
Togo	2007	Leg.	CAR
Tunisia	1994	Pres.+Leg.	HAR
Tunisia	1999	Pres.+Leg.	HAR
Tunisia	2004	Pres.+Leg.	HAR
Uganda	2001	Pres.	CAR
Uganda	2006	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Ukraine	1994	Pres.	CAR
Ukraine	1998	Leg.	CAR
Ukraine	1999	Pres.	CAR
Ukraine	2002	Leg.	CAR
Ukraine	2004	Pres.	CAR
Yemen	1997	Leg.	CAR
Yemen	1999	Pres.	CAR
Yemen	2003	Leg.	CAR
Yemen	2006	Pres.	HAR
Zambia	2001	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Zambia	2006	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Zimbabwe	1990	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Zimbabwe	1995	Leg.	HAR
Zimbabwe	1996	Pres.	HAR
Zimbabwe	2000	Leg.	HAR
Zimbabwe	2002	Pres.	CAR
Zimbabwe	2005	Leg.	CAR

Supplementary Appendix B. Transitions to Electoral Democracy in HARs and CARs, 1990-2007

Country	Year	Elec. Type	Regime Type
Armenia	1999	Leg.	CAR
Bangladesh	1991	Leg.	CAR
Bosnia	1996	Pres.+Leg.	HAR
Burundi	2005	Leg.	HAR
Djibouti	1999	Pres.	CAR
Dominican Republic	1996	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Georgia	2004	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Ghana	1996	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Guyana	1992	Pres.+Leg.	HAR
Haiti	2006	Pres.+Leg.	HAR
Indonesia	1999	Leg.	CAR
Kenya	2002	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Kyrgystan	1995	Pres.	HAR
Lesotho	2002	Leg.	HAR
Madagascar	1993	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Mexico	2000	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Nicaragua	1990	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Niger	1999	Pres.	CAR
Paraguay	1993	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Peru	2001	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Romania	1992	Pres.+Leg.	CAR
Russia	1993	Leg.	CAR

Supplementary Appendix C. Coding Rules and Sources

Opposition Coalition

Howard and Roessler's (2006) data on opposition coalitions were used for the 50 elections they include in their analysis. Remaining elections were coded using news sources gleaned from the LexisNexis Academic database.

A case is coded as having an opposition coalition if most (including the largest) opposition parties cooperate in at least one of the following ways:

- by creating a new party or formal coalition that appears on the ballot
- by creating coalition or movement that campaigns together, though individual parties still appear separately on the ballot
- by uniting behind a single opposition presidential candidate.

Coalitions of small parties which exclude one or more large opposition parties are not coded as coalitions; conversely, a case is coded as a coalition if it includes all major opposition parties even if one or more minor parties do not join in.

Each case was coded by two trained research assistants working independently. Coding discrepancies were resolved by the author.

Supplementary Appendix C, continued.

International Conditionality

Coding of conditionality is based, first, on comprehensive searches of international newspapers and newswires conducted through the LexisNexis Academic database for each election in the dataset. Searches in LexisNexis specified the name of the country; a date range from 4 months prior to the election, through the date of the first round of the election; the name and acronym of each of the international actors coded in the data; and the following search terms: *election, elect, electoral*. This was supplemented with searches of the ProQuest and Facts on File databases, and Keesings Record of World Events. For conditionality imposed by international organizations, coding was supplemented via reports, documents and resolutions posted on the organizations' websites.

Pre-election conditionality is coded as occurring if one or more actors threatened/imposed punishments, or promised/granted rewards conditional on good electoral conduct.

- Punishments can be economic (e.g., sanctions, withdrawal of aid), or political (e.g., suspension of diplomatic ties, visa bans, suspension of membership in international organization). For example, prior to the election, an international actor may threaten that membership in an IGO depends on the conduct of the election being "free and fair."
- Particular statements that constitute threats could include "measures will be taken," "further integration is at risk," or "closer relations are at risk."
- Rewards can be economic (e.g., aid, trade agreements) or political (e.g., IGO membership; starting negotiations on an association agreement with the EU). For example, prior to the election, an international actor may promise a reward if the election is "free and fair" or if it is conducted "in line with international standards."

Supplementary Appendix C, continued.

Electoral Misconduct Intensity

The index of misconduct intensity (which ranges in value from 1 to 3) assigns one point to misconduct in each of three areas. These three forms of misconduct, and the specific tools associated with them, are as follows:

- **Restrictions on Freedom of Movement, Expression or Association:**
  - Existence of unduly or arbitrary burdens on opposition parties' ability to register and/or appear on the ballot
  - Intimidation of opposition parties, candidates or supporters
  - Restrictions on opposition party campaign activity

- **Creation of a Biased Playing Field:**
  - Restrictions on the media's ability to report on the campaign
  - Imbalance in media reporting and access
  - *De facto* or *de jure* bias within institutions that organize and arbitrate elections
  - Misuse of state resources to help the incumbent or ruling party's campaign

- **Ballot Fraud:**
  - Intimidation of voters on election day
  - Systematic omission of voters from registration lists
  - Multiple voting
  - Ballot box tampering or stuffing
  - Destruction or alteration of ballots
  - Faulty counting or tabulation of ballots
  - Certification of fraudulent results

If one or more tools of misconduct in a given category was present, that category was assigned one point. A variety of sources were consulted. First, I gathered information from the *NELDA* dataset,[35] which includes answers to more than sixty questions on the conduct and outcome of elections, coded using international news reports, U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports, and other elections databases. Four questions from *NELDA* are directly relevant to the categories of electoral misconduct identified above:

- *Q 13:* Were opposition leaders prevented from running?
- *Q 15:* Is there evidence that the government harassed the opposition?
- *Q 16:* In the run-up to the election, were there allegations of media bias in favor of the incumbent?
- *Q 47:* Were there allegations by Western monitors of significant vote fraud?

[35] Data are available at < http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/> See: Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov. 2009. National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy: Which Elections Can Be Lost? Working Paper, Yale University.

Supplementary Appendix C, continued.

To supplement this information, and because NELDA contains some missing data points, the conduct of each election was then subjected to extensive additional investigation. First, information on the verdicts and reports of international election observers was collected for those elections in the data which hosted observation missions. Information from these missions was gleaned by accessing their official reports and press releases. Because not all observation missions are credible, coding is based only on information reported by observers from nine entities, which analysts consider to be among the most active and professional of all the international monitoring groups:[36] Carter Center, Commonwealth Secretariat, Council of Europe, European Union, National Democratic Institute, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organization of American States, United Nations, United States.

For cases in which international observers were not present or where information on the observers' reports was not available, exhaustive searches of international newspapers and newswires were conducted via the LexisNexis Academic database. Searches in LexisNexis specified the name of the country; a date range from 4 months prior to the election, up to and including the date of the last round of the election; and the following search terms: *election, elect, electoral, observer, observation, monitor, monitoring, "free and fair", misconduct, manipulation, opposition, ban, banned, repress, repression, harass, harassment, media, press*.

Each election was investigated by at least two trained research assistants working independently. Coding discrepancies were resolved by the author.

[36] On which groups are more professional than others, see: Kelley, Judith. 2009. D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation. *International Organization* 63 (4):765-787. See also: Bjornlund, Eric C. 2004. *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Supplementary Appendix D. Table 1 Models with Alternate Coding of Democratization[37]

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	0.52	0.52	0.16	0.18	0.58+
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.68)	(0.64)	(0.08)
Opposition Coalition		0.57+	-5.28**	1.04*	
		(0.06)	(0.00)	(0.01)	
International Conditionality		-0.02	0.61	-5.87**	
		(0.96)	(0.17)	(0.00)	
CAR x Opp. Coalition			6.50**		
			(0.00)		
CAR x Conditionality				6.74**	
				(0.00)	
Main Election	1.40**	1.40**	1.61*	1.64**	1.54*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Incumbent Running	-0.48	-0.46	-0.38	-0.45	-0.37
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.18)	(0.31)
# Previous Elections	-0.11	-0.17	-0.11	-0.13	-0.03
	(0.31)	(0.13)	(0.36)	(0.28)	(0.80)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.06	-0.02	0.00	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.62)	(0.90)	(0.99)	(0.57)	(0.54)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.51)	(0.60)	(0.61)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.19	0.04	-0.01	-0.10	0.58
	(0.69)	(0.93)	(0.98)	(0.87)	(0.40)
Americas	0.92*	0.90*	1.50**	1.55**	1.12**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Misconduct Intensity			-0.71**	-0.68**	-0.59**
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Regime Openness			0.07	0.07	0.12
			(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.43)
Prior Liberalization			0.11	0.12	0.08
			(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.53)
Constant	-2.15*	-2.53*	-2.52+	-2.01+	-2.29+
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)
Pseudo R^2	.23	.25	.39	.39	.32
Log pseudo-likelihood	-47.08	-45.81	-36.80	-36.82	-41.62
Observations	203	203	203	203	203

Robust p values in parentheses
Two-tailed tests: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

[37] Interaction terms for *CAR x Opp. Coalition* and *CAR x Conditionality* are entered in separate models because convergence failed when both were entered simultaneously. The variable for *Alternation* in the previous election is omitted in these models because it is perfectly collinear with the dependent variable.

Supplementary Appendix E. Table 1 Models with U.S. Military Assistance Priority

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
U.S. Military Assistance Priority	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.99)	(0.74)	(0.98)	(0.87)	(0.89)
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	0.46+	0.49	0.03	0.06	0.42
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.94)	(0.85)	(0.13)
Opposition Coalition		0.51+	-0.18	0.18	
		(0.08)	(0.65)	(0.65)	
International Conditionality		0.41	-0.55	-0.35	
		(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.48)	
CAR x Opp. Coalition			0.99+	0.75	
			(0.07)	(0.18)	
CAR x Conditionality			1.42*	1.28*	
			(0.03)	(0.04)	
Main Election	0.83**	0.81*	0.89**	0.84*	0.78*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Incumbent Running	-0.28	-0.21	-0.27	-0.11	-0.20
	(0.37)	(0.51)	(0.42)	(0.73)	(0.52)
# Previous Elections	-0.11	-0.17+	-0.19+	-0.16	-0.08
	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.38)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.20+	-0.19	-0.24+	-0.26*	-0.24*
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.15)
Central and Eastern Europe	1.11**	0.97*	0.80+	0.87+	1.25**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.01)
Americas	1.13**	1.15**	1.51**	1.49**	1.15**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Alternation, Previous Elec.				0.15	0.09
				(0.82)	(0.88)
Misconduct Intensity				-0.28*	-0.19
				(0.04)	(0.12)
Regime Openness				0.16	0.18
				(0.32)	(0.20)
Prior Liberalization				0.08	0.06
				(0.57)	(0.62)
Constant	-0.52	-0.73	-0.16	-0.46	-0.70
	(0.54)	(0.44)	(0.87)	(0.69)	(0.48)
Pseudo R^2	.22	.25	.28	.32	.25
Log pseudo-likelihood	-63.16	-60.99	-58.48	-55.72	-60.82
Observations	203	203	203	203	203

Robust p values in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%